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ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND THE SOCIAL PROJECT OF
DECARBONIZATION
Shelley Welton*
Decarbonization is the process of converting our economy from one
that runs predominantly on energy derived from fossil fuels to one that
runs almost exclusively on clean, carbon-free energy. If pursued on the
scale that experts believe necessary to prevent dangerous climate change,
the infrastructure changes required to decarbonize the United States will
have significant social and cultural implications. States aggressively
pursuing decarbonization have adopted policies reflecting their under-
standing that decarbonization is a social project implicating numerous
value choices. Various state decarbonization policies combine the aim of
decarbonization with job promotion, economic development, income
redistribution, urban revitalization, open-space preservation, and the
continuation of traditional livelihoods.
These multifaceted state climate policies are multiplying in the
Trump era, as federal alternatives recede. But variegated state policies
present a challenge to the smooth functioning of U.S. electricity markets,
which operate across states to supply least-cost power on a region-wide
basis. To address this friction, regulators at the federal and state levels
are considering a novel solution: Perhaps these markets should incorpo-
rate the aim of decarbonization rather than leaving this job for the
states. There is a clear argument in favor of such reforms—they would
allow states to accomplish decarbonization at lower cost while protecting
electricity markets from distortionary state policies.
Nevertheless, this Article questions the widespread enthusiasm for
using regional electricity markets, rather than states, as the primary
drivers of decarbonization. Rather than accounting for the social and
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cultural values at stake in decarbonization, the process of integrating
decarbonization into electricity markets prioritizes the aim of least-cost
decarbonization above all else—thus rejecting states’ more capacious
understandings of the goals of decarbonization. Moreover, regional
electricity markets are quasi-private, complexly structured membership
organizations, which operate under federal oversight and provide lim-
ited formal channels for state input. Consequently, if regional electricity
markets become the primary locus of decarbonization policy, states will
have given away a rich set of policy tools for publicly, creatively, and
flexibly managing the trajectory of decarbonization. Understanding
decarbonization as a social project thus provides new stakes in the other-
wise technocratic debate over electricity markets and climate change,
highlighting the importance of maintaining the public voice in critical
decisions made around how to decarbonize.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the Trump Administration’s priorities during its first year has
been the rollback of federal actions to address climate change. In addition
to reconsidering several critical domestic regulations,1 President Trump
announced on June 1, 2017, his intention to withdraw the United States
from the Paris Accord2—the landmark international agreement on climate
change signed by 195 parties.3 Shortly after this announcement, U.S. states
struck back in an aggressive demonstration of their resurgent place in cli-
mate policy. In a letter titled “We Are Still In,” several states declared that
“[i]n the absence of leadership from Washington,” they would “work[]
together to take forceful action and to ensure that the U.S. remains a
global leader in reducing emissions.”4 States are backing up this promise
with escalating state laws aimed at “decarbonization”—that is, the
process of ending reliance on energy sources that emit carbon
pollution.5
Leading states have passed legislation to reduce carbon emissions in
their jurisdictions 80% by 2050, with a focus on reducing carbon pollu-
tion from electricity.6 These are ambitious goals, likely to require the
1. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,093–95 (Mar. 28, 2017) (revok-
ing several of President Obama’s climate-related actions and ordering further review of
various environmental regulations).
2. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, White House (June
1, 2017), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-
trump-paris-climate-accord [http://perma.cc/RPC7-ZD8J].
3. Paris Agreement—Status of Ratification, United Nations Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php [http://perma.cc/49U8-5QUL] (last
visited Jan. 18, 2018) (showing signing and ratification status).
4. “We Are Still In” Declaration, We Are Still In, http://www.wearestillin.com/we-
are-still-declaration [http://perma.cc/SRL6-QR9U] (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). States are
joined in the letter by tribes, cities, colleges, universities, businesses, and investors. Id.
Nine states have signed as of January 2018. See id.
5. See infra section I.B.
6. For a catalog of states embracing this goal, see infra note 72 and accompanying
text. Decarbonizing electricity is critical because experts predict that global greenhouse
gas emissions must approach zero in the coming decades, even though electricity con-
sumption is expected to double as transportation electrifies. See 2 James H. Williams et al.,
Energy & Envtl. Econ., Inc. & Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, Policy Implications
of Deep Decarbonization in the United States 4 (2015) [hereinafter Williams et al., Deep
Decarbonization Policy], http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
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replacement of significant infrastructure at substantial expense.7 And yet,
in setting policies to achieve these goals, no state has adopted a purely
market-based system that aims to reduce emissions at the lowest cost above
all other goals.8 Instead, states have crafted schemes that help them
manage the contours, aims, and consequences of decarbonization. These
state policies include requirements that utilities buy certain amounts and
types of renewable energy, incentives for communities to build their own
solar farms, payments to aging (and appealingly carbon-free) nuclear
power plants to keep them from retiring, and complete redesign of state
electricity law.9 These various policies combine decarbonization with aims
ranging from job creation and economic development to income redis-
tribution, urban revitalization, open-space preservation, and the continu-
ation of traditional livelihoods.10
There is, however, a potential downside to this rich set of state climate
policies. As state ambitions ramp up, complications with this state-by-state
approach to decarbonizing electricity become more apparent. States
share jurisdiction over electricity with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC).11 In most of the country, states have ceded partial
control over electricity supply to regional electricity-market operators,
which are “hybrid” quasi-private, quasi-governmental entities, comprised
of industry members functioning under FERC oversight.12 These electri-
city markets are designed to select least-cost sources of electricity; they do
US_Deep_Decarbonization_Policy_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/T9FD-TD2C] (“Limiting
warming to 2°C or less, an objective agreed upon by the international community, will
require that global net [greenhouse gas] emissions approach zero by the second half of
the 21st century.”); see also William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism:
Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 810, 812 (2016)
(“[D]ecarbonizing the electric power sector is far and away the most important
component of any effort to meet ambitious U.S. [greenhouse gas] reduction targets by
2050 and beyond.”).
7. See Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82
Brook. L. Rev. 645, 663–64 (2017) (noting that decarbonization “stands to be one of the
most significant economic transformations the economy has experienced in the last cen-
tury”); see also infra note 281.
8. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Carbon Taxation by Regulation, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 277, 298–
99 (2017) [hereinafter Ross, Carbon Taxation] (noting that various approaches to internal
subsidies “fall considerably short of the efficiency and social-welfare benefits that a carbon
tax could provide”).
9. See infra section I.B.
10. See infra sections I.B, II.B.
11. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012) (providing federal jurisdiction over “the transmis-
sion of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at whole-
sale in interstate commerce,” but otherwise reserving authority for states). For more
detail, see infra Part I.
12. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 1, 6 (describing how “the tripartite energy system [of physical, regulatory, and
market components] involve[s] numerous public and private stakeholders at multiple
levels of government”). Electricity-market structures are discussed in sections I.A and III.B.
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not “price in” carbon or otherwise favor carbon-free generation sources.13
Consequently, many allege that state incentives and payment schemes
targeted at particular low-carbon technologies interfere with the smooth
functioning of these regional markets.14
Now, faced with a growing number of divergent state policies, several
regional market operators have accepted that electricity markets may need
to play a more active role in decarbonization.15 One key question under
discussion is whether it is time to redesign electricity markets to achieve
states’ decarbonization goals.16 Such proposals gained momentum in May
2017 when FERC convened a conference to consider their feasibility and
desirability.17 In her opening remarks, then-acting FERC Chair Cheryl
LaFleur identified these potential reforms as “the most critical issue [the
agency was] confronting.”18 Since that time, debates have intensified regard-
ing how much of a challenge renewable energy presents to electricity
markets and how best to manage the shifting composition of electricity-
market resources.19
13. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (noting that electricity markets are
designed for least-cost electricity and are therefore limited in accommodating other
goals); see also infra text accompanying note 237 (describing the aims of a carbon-pricing
scheme).
14. See infra section I.C.
15. See infra sections I.C, III.A; see also William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-
Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1614, 1686–87 (2014) (“From a climate change perspec-
tive . . . the looming question is whether electricity markets can deliver significant carbon
reductions over the next several decades.”).
16. Many people in this conversation distinguish between two ways that markets
could be redesigned to support state climate policies. Markets could either be tweaked to
accommodate state policies without attempting to supplant them, or markets could be used
to achieve state climate goals. See Cheryl A. LaFleur, Comm’r, FERC, Remarks at FERC
Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO New
England Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc., and PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., at 229–30 (May 1, 2017) [hereinafter LaFleur, FERC Technical Conference],
http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170530122035-Transcript,%20May%201,%202017.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QNK2-7SZZ] (distinguishing between “achieve”-style solutions, in
which markets are redesigned to accomplish state policy goals, and “accommodate”-style
solutions, in which markets are adjusted to function around state policy goals);
Memorandum from New England States Comm. on Elec. to New England Power Pool 1–2
(Apr. 7, 2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing NESCOE’s feedback on
the “long-term ‘achieve’-style proposals,” as well as NESCOE’s plan to assess a “short-term,
‘accommodate’-style proposal”). This Article focuses on the “achieve” category of
solutions, although it briefly touches upon the potential to accommodate state policies.
See infra Part IV.
17. See FERC Calendar of Events, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/
EventDetails.aspx?ID=8663&CalType=%20&CalendarID=116&Date=&View=Listview [http://
perma.cc/G7B4-JUEN] (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
18. LaFleur, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 16, at 9.
19. Most notably—and to the consternation of many—the Department of Energy
recently requested that FERC consider providing subsidies to “fuel-secure” nuclear and
coal plants as a way to respond to changes in market dynamics that have rendered these
resources less competitive than natural gas and renewable energy in many parts of the
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There is obvious appeal to using electricity markets to achieve state
climate change goals. Integrating these goals into markets could lower
the cost of decarbonizing energy, while eliminating the risk that accret-
ing state policies might distort the functioning of electricity markets. For
this reason, many stakeholders that often find themselves on opposite
sides of energy policy debates have expressed support for integrating
state climate policies into regional electricity markets.20 It can thus feel
almost reflexively reactionary for anyone who supports rapid decarboni-
zation to resist such efforts.
Nevertheless, this Article argues that states should exercise caution in
ceding control over decarbonization too quickly or thoroughly to regional
electricity markets. This argument is grounded in comparative institu-
tional competencies21 and the importance of preserving state centrality
in decisionmaking over decarbonization.22 In short, states do a disservice
to current and future residents if they cede the shape of decarbonization
policy to market insiders and experts rather than subject these policy
decisions to wider democratic inquiry, debate, and decisionmaking.
Although conversations about electricity markets and decarboniza-
tion can quickly alienate all but the most technocratic insiders, decarbon-
ization is far more than a technical project. Decarbonization policies will
country. See Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940, 46,945 (Oct. 10, 2017) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). For those expressing consternation, see, e.g., Sonal Patel,
What States Told FERC About the DOE’s Grid Resiliency Rule, PowerMag (Oct. 25, 2017),
http://www.powermag.com/what-states-told-ferc-about-the-does-grid-resiliency-rule-infographic
[http://perma.cc/93ZV-2V5F] (mapping state responses to the DOE’s proposal and
showing many states in key RTO regions to be “strongly opposed”); Jeff St. John, DOE’s
Coal, Nuclear Cost Recovery Plan Receives Onslaught of Opposition, Greentech Media
(Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/doe-coal-nuclear-cost-
recovery-opposition-perry#gs.6b25rRU [http://perma.cc/MW92-GAHA] (“The proposal
has drawn a backlash from major sectors of the energy industry, and the critique of two of
three seated FERC commissioners at present, based on the potentially dire impacts it
could have on the country’s relatively well-run and low-cost electricity markets.”). Section
IV.C discusses the DOE Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) in more detail. For
FERC’s response, see infra notes 332–334.
20. Of note, several environmental not-for-profits find themselves aligned with fossil
fuel generators on this topic. See infra Part III; see also Gavin Bade, The Carbon
Consensus: Generators, Analysts Back CO2 Price at FERC Technical Conference, Util. Dive
(May 3, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-carbon-consensus-generators-analysts-
back-co2-price-at-ferc-technical/441862/ [http://perma.cc/4F9N-UWNS] (“[O]ne note-
worthy area of consensus emerged from nearly every corner of the diverse stakeholder
group—the need to price carbon in wholesale power markets.”).
21. See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,
Economics, and Public Policy 4–6 (1994) (arguing that “deciding who decides” is a critical
part of legal analysis and calling for greater attention to comparative institutional
analysis).
22. “State” in this context refers to government. This Article does not intend to make
a federalism argument, but rather proceeds on the assumption that states will be the level
of government that primarily addresses decarbonization for the next several years. See
Rossi, Carbon Taxation, supra note 8, at 278 (describing federal carbon tax legislation as
“infeasible and . . . stalled, at least for the foreseeable future”); see also infra section IV.D.
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determine how our society extracts, owns, sites, manages, moves, consumes,
and conserves electricity in the future. Given electricity’s centrality to
modern life, such policies have the potential to radically alter political
and economic power, as well as to shape the future of American land-
scapes, communities, and daily living arrangements.23 Decarbonization is
thus a profoundly social project.24
In crafting multifaceted, nuanced decarbonization policies, states
are demonstrating their understanding of this fact. State climate policies
reflect state preferences about how they decarbonize, instead of just
whether they decarbonize. These diverse public preferences would be lost
in the integration of state policy aims into regional electricity markets.
This Article identifies three particular risks electricity markets present in
this regard. The first is the loss of transparent, government-driven deci-
sionmaking on the trajectory of decarbonization. Electricity markets are
governed through quasi-private, immensely technocratic, and largely
opaque processes25—hardly the space in which we should center debates
over the shape of decarbonization. The second risk is one of homogeni-
zation to the lowest common denominator. Electricity-market design lim-
its the tools with which states can respond to decarbonization, requiring
states to homogenize their preferences. In practice, such homogeniza-
tion is likely to water down more ambitious state policies to achieve the
near-consensus buy-in of states and stakeholders required in regional
electricity-market governance.
The final risk to electricity-market integration of state climate poli-
cies stems from the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hughes v. Talen
Energy Marketing, LLC.26 There, the Supreme Court placed limits on
states’ abilities to adopt policies that regulate electricity in ways too
closely linked to federally overseen markets.27 Although Hughes left open
significant questions regarding how much overlap there can be between
regional-market functions and state policy aims, it creates legal risk
around any state decision to cede decarbonization goals to the markets.28
Once a state gives control over a particular function—like decarboniza-
tion—to its regional market, it may diminish the set of tools that it can
use at the state level to accomplish the same policy aim.
23. See infra section II.A.
24. This point is well made outside the legal literature, see infra note 147, but its
implications for climate law and policy are surprisingly undertheorized. In a forthcoming
article, Professor Alice Kaswan explores how decarbonization’s society-wide impacts might
inform our understanding of the drawbacks of market-based mechanisms more generally,
but she does not address the proposal to use regional electricity markets in particular. See
Alice Kaswan, Energy, Governance, and Market Mechanisms, 72 Miami L. Rev. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 1–11) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
25. See infra section III.A.
26. 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
27. Id. at 1299.
28. See infra section III.B.
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Articulating these reasons for caution does not mean that states
should resist all efforts to integrate decarbonization aims into regional
electricity markets. Instead, these risks point to a series of conclusions
about when market integration of state climate policies is advisable and
how it might best proceed. First, states might prefer using regional elec-
tricity markets as a climate tool when their objective is the cheapest decar-
bonization possible, without regard for what resources the market selects
or where these resources are located. In contrast, if a state has resource
preferences, distributional goals, or other objectives related to how decar-
bonization proceeds, markets will prove inapt tools. For these states, market
integration may prove advisable only if the particular market reform
selected allows states leeway to adjust their preferences and factor them
into the market design.29
Second, the regional politics of decarbonization should inform state
decisions. U.S. states diverge considerably in the ambition of their climate
policies, from states pledging to go “100% renewable” to states focused
on perpetuating U.S. coal consumption.30 As this Article explains, the struc-
ture of U.S. electricity law leaves regional market entities without the
authority to mandate that recalcitrant states adopt more aggressive cli-
mate policies.31 Nevertheless, perhaps there is still some bargaining power
inherent in the regional market construct, such that states aggressive on
climate change might use market solutions to coax along less willing
regional neighbors. The greater the likelihood of such persuasion suc-
ceeding, the more appealing a market-based solution should be.32
Finally, the appeal of integrating state policies into regional markets
might shift over time as courts flesh out the boundaries of the Hughes deci-
sion and related cases.33 Because of these variables at play, the question of
how to manage the intersection of state policies and regional electricity
markets is likely to be a dynamic and region-specific one. Nevertheless,
there is value in understanding at the outset of these conversations the
risks that the marketization of state climate policies presents to the multi-
faceted project of decarbonization. Only states ready to relinquish control
over their decarbonization trajectory in exchange for cost effectiveness
should embrace market integration proposals as they stand now.
29. Part IV explains how certain market reforms might allow for this more easily than
others.
30. For a catalog of some of the most ambitious state renewable energy targets, see
generally infra notes 87–88. For state support of coal, see generally Kathiann M. Kowalski,
As Ohio Legislature Regroups, Power Plant Subsidy Debate to Continue, Midwest Energy
News (Aug. 16, 2017), http://midwestenergynews.com/2017/08/16/as-ohio-legislature-
regroups-power-plant-subsidy-debate-continues/ [http://perma.cc/88NJ-RATC] (detailing
legislative efforts in Ohio to provide subsidies to “1950s-era coal plants” and nuclear
generation).
31. See infra section IV.C.
32. See infra section IV.A.
33. See infra section III.C.
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Most scholarly analysis of these proposed electricity-market reforms
has focused on the jurisdictional questions they present. Regional elec-
tricity-market operators are constrained by the Federal Power Act’s man-
date that federally overseen markets ensure “just and reasonable” rates.34
Whether integrating decarbonization goals falls within this mandate is a
thorny legal question, and many prominent energy law scholars are puz-
zling through this jurisdictional morass.35
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012).
35. See 2 Steven Weissman & Romany Webb, Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Energy & the
Env’t, Addressing Climate Change Without Legislation: FERC § 3.1 (2014), http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/CLEE/FERC_Report_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XE7-R4Q7]
(“In addition to considering . . . supplier and customer interests, FERC’s ratemaking must
also protect the general public interest.”); Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp,
Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 275, 278
(2014) (arguing that the Federal Power Act (FPA) authorizes FERC to consider the
environmental effects of power generation in setting just and reasonable rates); Joel Eisen,
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1783,
1788 (2016) (arguing that “the FPA’s terms are not frozen in amber, as the statute has
adapted to changing market realities” and that, in FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n
(FERC v. EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016), “the Court has properly confirmed that the FPA
has flexibility to address modern developments in the electric grid”); Ari Peskoe, Easing
Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38
Energy L.J. 1, 1 (2017) (exploring “FERC’s authority under the [FPA] to approve a
wholesale market tariff that facilitates market participants’ achievement of their legal
obligations under renewable energy and CO2 policies”); Rossi, Carbon Taxation, supra
note 8, at 330 (arguing that “FERC has the authority to adopt grid-system-reliability adders
reflecting the carbon attributes of different energy resources”); see also Kate Konschnik &
Ari Peskoe, Harvard Envtl. Law Program Policy Initiative, Minimizing Constitutional Risk:
Crafting State Energy Policies that Can Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny 11–15 (2014),
http://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/minimizing-constitutional-
risk2.pdf [http://perma.cc/JS8G-SPGZ] (noting that “[s]tate regulation of wholesale rates
is . . . generally field preempted” and highlighting three policies that may constitute
impermissible ratemaking—mandating feed-in tariffs, guaranteeing generator revenue in
regions with federally regulated auction markets, and pricing renewable energy credits);
Matthew R. Christiansen, FERC v. EPSA: Functionalism and the Electricity Industry of the
Future, 68 Stan. L. Rev. Online 100, 101–02 (2016), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/
online/ferc-v-epsa/ [http://perma.cc/4LQ8-KSVJ] (describing the Supreme Court’s analysis
in FERC v. EPSA as “eschewing some of the rhetoric regarding ‘bright line’ [jurisdictional]
rules on which the Court had relied in previous FPA cases in favor of a more flexible
approach that applied the FPA’s basic premise to the changing industry”); Joel B. Eisen,
Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, but How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8 Geo. Wash. J.
Energy & Envtl. L. 3, 6 (2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual Electricity] (arguing that Hughes v.
Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016), “raises more questions than it
answers about which state initiatives are permissible”); Emily Hammond, Hughes v. Talen
Energy Marketing, LLC: Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries—Take Three, Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. Docket (2016), http://www.gwlr.org/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc-energy-
laws-jurisdictional-boundaries-take-three [http://perma.cc/4WEF-ABWE] (“Hughes doesn’t
really tell us which state initiatives will survive future Supremacy Clause challenges and
which will fail.”); Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 293, 294 (2016) (noting that the question of which level of government
should regulate an activity is “contentious” and suggesting a preemption framework for
energy law).
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Less explored, however, is the question of whether states should want
regional markets to perform this service, legality aside. Often, energy law
scholars approach such questions over state versus regional market con-
trol through the lens of federalism—asking whether FERC or the states
are better positioned to take the lead.36 This Article frames these debates
differently, highlighting the ways in which they implicate long-standing
institutional design choices between complex, heavily managed market
constructs and more direct regulatory control by states.37 Framing the
issue in this way lends relevance to a separate genre of scholarship,
focused on questions of how markets, public policy, and values inter-
sect.38 Drawing from this literature, the Article illuminates the ways in
which decarbonization is a normative societal project—one with con-
tested visions and outcomes. Decarbonization might radically redistribute
wealth and power in U.S. society, or it might largely maintain the status
quo while shifting only behind-the-scenes fuel choices.39 State policies
reflect and embody this contest while regional markets present a homog-
enizing and privatizing force that narrows the room in which to debate
the many shapes a decarbonized society might take.
36. See, e.g., Boyd & Carlson, supra note 6, at 812–20; Felix Mormann, Clean Energy
Federalism, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 1621, 1625–30 (2015); Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy
Federalism, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 399, 403 (2016) [hereinafter Rossi, Brave New Path].
37. Professor William Boyd began an evocative exploration of these themes in Public
Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, in which he argues that electricity markets are part of “a
broader understanding of public utility” and should be harnessed to normative ends.
Boyd, supra note 15, at 1673. Boyd’s analysis frames but does not answer the question tack-
led here—how, within this normative project, states should weigh the relative merits of
using markets or regulation to accomplish their decarbonizing aims. Professor Jim Rossi
has similarly reframed the conversation by identifying ways in which state decarbonization
policies resemble “carbon taxation by regulation.” See Rossi, Carbon Taxation, supra note
8, at 279–80. Rossi’s focus, however, is on how these regulatory instruments can be made
to resemble market mechanisms—a line of inquiry that deviates substantially from my
own. See id.; see also infra note 170. Professor David B. Spence also has insightful broader
work on these themes. See generally David B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 973 (2017) [hereinafter, Spence, Naïve Energy Markets] (explaining how
“energy markets can never resemble the idealized markets of economic theory that have
become so popular in conservative policy discourse”).
38. See infra Part II. See generally Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On
Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (2005) (criticizing the assign-
ment of monetary values to public health and environmental resources); Douglas A. Kysar,
Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity (2010)
(arguing against a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to environmental policy in
favor of an approach that is more morally accountable); Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the
Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (2d ed. 2008) (describing two conceptions
of the environment—as intrinsically sacrosanct and as a source of economic value—and
arguing that society must balance the two conceptions); Michael J. Sandel, What Money
Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (2012) (challenging the predominance of markets
and market-oriented thinking in the modern era); Boyd, supra note 15 (arguing that a
narrow conception of “public utility” has distorted understandings of the role of markets
and discussing its relationship to decarbonization).
39. See infra section II.A.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I gives an overview of
regional electricity markets, state climate change policies, and their inter-
sections. Part II explores the nature of the project of decarbonization, illus-
trating how state climate policies embody diverse preferences and values
that reflect an understanding of the significant choices at hand. Part III
shows how electricity-market redesign might eliminate these democrat-
ically determined value choices embedded in state climate policies,
laying out the challenges that result from using the peculiar governance
structures of electricity markets to carry out decarbonization. Part IV
presents lessons derived from this analysis for when states might prefer or
resist market integration of their decarbonization goals.
I. THE CURRENT MESH AND CLASH OF REGIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKETS
AND STATE CLIMATE POLICIES
To understand the debates about decarbonization roiling electricity
regulation, one has to begin with a foundation in the structure of elec-
tricity policy and electricity markets. This Part provides an overview of
regional electricity markets, state climate policies, and their potentially
troubling intersections.
A. Electricity Markets
Electricity governance in the United States is a patchwork affair, tak-
ing on various forms across states and regions that defy quick summa-
tion.40 This patchwork quality stems from the Federal Power Act of 1935,
which divides jurisdiction over electricity in the United States. The fed-
eral government—acting via FERC—has jurisdiction over “the sale of
[electric] energy at wholesale,” which comprises sales from electricity
generators to the utilities that own the transmission and distribution grid
that carries that electricity to end-use consumers.41 States retain control over
“retail sales” of electricity—sales that these utilities make to consumers.42
From 1935 until the 1990s, FERC had a fairly straightforward role in
electricity regulation. Most utilities owned their own generation resources
that they used to supply their retail customers, such that there were rela-
tively few “wholesale transactions” of electricity to regulate.43 In cases in
which one utility sold wholesale power to another, FERC fulfilled its duty
40. Cf. Paul L. Joskow, Markets for Power in the United States: An Interim
Assessment, 27 Energy J. 1, 4 (2006) (describing U.S. restructuring as occurring without “a
clear coherent blueprint,” unlike in other countries).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), (b)(1) (2012).
42. Id. § 824(b)(1).
43. Paul L. Joskow, Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in
the Electrical Power Industry, 1989 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity: Microeconomics
125, 134; see also Boyd & Carlson, supra note 6, at 824; David B. Spence, Can Law Manage
Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 765, 769–70 (2008) [hereinafter Spence,
Can Law Manage?].
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to ensure “just and reasonable” rates44 by requiring utilities to prefile the
rates they intended to charge for FERC-jurisdictional sales.45 At the same
time, states had their own public utility commissions (PUCs) to regulate
the rates that utilities could charge end-use customers.46 Thus, there was
relatively little difference in the character of regulation at the state and
federal levels—in either case, commissions oversaw regulated monopoly
entities.
In the 1990s, Congress and FERC—following on the heels of deregu-
lation in other major sectors, including airlines, trucking, communica-
tions, and railroads—took significant steps to promote market constructs
within federal electricity regulation.47 The first move in this direction was
a requirement that utilities allow other utilities to utilize their transmis-
sion lines at nondiscriminatory rates.48 Around the same time, many
states required their utilities to sell off generation assets so that the same
company would no longer comprise both the supply and demand side of
electricity transactions.49 With these two changes in place, the stage was
44. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(1).
45. See id. § 824d(c) (requiring such filings); W. Deptford Energy v. FERC, 766 F.3d
10, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Federal Power Act requires regulated utilities to file with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as a matter of open and accessible public record,
any rates and charges they intend to impose for sales of electrical energy that are subject
to the Commission’s jurisdiction.” (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c))).
46. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 6, at 822–23.
47. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721–722, 106 Stat. 2776
(1992) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j–k); Joskow, supra note 40, at 4–5 (describing FERC’s
“initiatives to support the creation of competitive wholesale markets”); see also Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1323 (1998) (explaining how FERC issued orders “designed to
increase the access of local distribution companies to lower-cost gas and to stimulate com-
petition”); Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal
Energy Law, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 611, 613 (2009) (“[The] Federal Power Act and the
Natural Gas Act have changed from a regulatory scheme that controlled market power
exercise by utilities, pipelines, and producers through classic rate regulation to a regula-
tory regime that controls the exercise of market power through reliance on a mixture of
competition and regulation.”); Spence, Can Law Manage?, supra note 43, at 765 (“Over
the last three decades, the world’s industrialized democracies have introduced competi-
tion into previously noncompetitive, regulated markets.”).
48. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,603 (Apr.
24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (“[I]f a transmission provider offers a rate discount
to its affiliate, or if the transmission provider attributes a discounted rate to its own trans-
actions, the same discounted rate must also be offered at the same time to non-affiliates on
the same transmission path and on all unconstrained transmission paths.”); Open Access
Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and
Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737, 21,740 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 37) (“This final rule . . . will ensure that transmission customers have access to
transmission information enabling them to obtain open access transmission service on a
non-discriminatory basis.”).
49. See Joskow, supra note 40, at 7 (noting that FERC “could not and did not” order
utilities to do this, but state initiatives and market opportunities “led to a considerable
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set for the birth of electricity markets—exchanges in which generators
could bid in offers to sell electricity and utilities could seek out the low-
est-priced sources of electricity to supply their customers.
In 1999, FERC issued Order 2000, which encouraged—but did not
require—states and utilities to form regional electricity-management
organizations, called either “Regional Transmission Organizations” (RTOs)
or “Independent System Operators” (ISOs).50 These entities would be
“independent grid management organizations” in charge of managing
the transmission grid and running electricity markets to procure and dis-
patch least-cost electricity across the region.51
Some states and their utilities opted in; others declined—hence the
patchwork nature of the present system. Today, seven RTOs serve around
two-thirds of the U.S. population.52 These RTOs range in size from single-
state (for example, those that serve New York or California) to fifteen-
state (for example, MISO, the RTO serving the upper Midwest).53 FERC
oversees all of these regional entities except for that of Texas, whose RTO
has no interstate transmission connections to bring it within federal
amount of restructuring of the ownership of existing generating plants”); see also Robert
J. Michaels, The Governance of Transmission Operators, 20 Energy L.J. 233, 236 (1999)
(describing the regulatory actions taken by FERC in the late 1990s).
50. There is no functional difference between RTOs and ISOs for the purposes of
this Article, and this Article refers to all such entities as RTOs hereinafter. See Regional
Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 (Dec. 20, 1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35) (“Industry participants . . . retain flexibility in structuring RTOs that satisfy the
minimum characteristics and functions. . . . The characteristics and functions could be
satisfied by different organizational forms, such as ISOs . . . .”); see also Seth Blumsack,
Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid Integration, 28 Energy L.J.
147, 147 n.1 (2007) (“There are some differences between ISOs and RTOs in their govern-
ance structure and congestion management protocols. Operationally, ISOs and RTOs look
very similar.”).
51. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 813–15; see also
Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public
Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28
Energy L.J. 543, 553 (2007) (listing RTOs’ multiple functions).
52. Susan F. Tierney, Senior Advisor, Analysis Grp., Remarks at FERC Technical
Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New England Inc.,
New York Independent System Operator, Inc., and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at n.1
(Apr. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Tierney, FERC Technical Conference], http://www.ferc.gov/
CalendarFiles/20170426151811-Tierney,%20Analysis%20Group.pdf [http://perma.cc/
32J3-VVS7] (“The current U.S. population is 325 million. According to the ISO/RTO
Council, the seven U.S. regional transmission organizations (RTO) and independent
system operators (ISOs) provide service in regions where 218 million people live . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
53. About MISO, MISO, http://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUs/Pages/AboutUs.aspx
[http://perma.cc/FKZ4-SKX8] (last visited Jan. 18, 2018); ISO/RTO Council, NYISO,
http://www.nyiso.com/public/markets_operations/services/planning/iso_rto/index.jsp
[http://perma.cc/9Q9E-44Y5] (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (mapping New York and
California ISOs).
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jurisdiction. 54 As a general matter, states outside of these regions
continue to exercise substantially more direct oversight of generation
resources.
In RTO regions, FERC has stepped away from direct policy oversight
of wholesale electricity prices toward using markets as a tool to ensure
just and reasonable prices. In these regions, generators can sell power
either through bilateral contracts or through centralized electricity mar-
kets administered by RTOs.55 These are hardly “free” markets, though.
FERC and the RTOs oversee these markets through a complex set of rules
and agreements that establish what can be bought and sold, by whom,
and how.56
Some regions—in particular, regions in the East—have chosen to
administer separate “capacity markets” to ensure that enough new gener-
ation is built to serve future needs.57 In these markets, generators58 bid in
54. Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/indus-act/rto/ercot.asp [http://perma.cc/PQ4X-DFPW] (last updated
Nov. 17, 2015).
55. See Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the
Marketplace, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 141, 154 (2016). Markets for electricity operate on both a
day-ahead and a real-time basis, with the latter market making up for any imbalances in
supply and demand that occur close to the time of electricity delivery. Id. Bilateral con-
tracting continues to make up a sizeable portion of electricity sales even in RTO regions.
See, e.g., Collin Cain & Jonathan Lesser, Bates White Econ. Consulting, A Common Sense
Guide to Wholesale Electric Markets 11 (2007), http://www.bateswhite.com/media/
publication/55_media.741.pdf [http://perma.cc/YJ4F-PSZ3] (“Most wholesale power is
bought and sold through bilateral contracts, freely negotiated between individual buyers
and sellers. In PJM, for example, about 85% of all market sales are bilateral.”).
56. See Travis Kavulla, There Is No Free Market for Electricity: Can There Ever Be?,
Am. Aff., http://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/no-free-market-electricity-can-ever/
[http://perma.cc/S23A-7VGA] (last visited Apr. 16, 2018) (emphasizing how heavily
regulated these markets are).
57. New England, New York, and PJM currently administer forward-looking capacity
markets. Am. Pub. Power Ass’n, RTO Capacity Markets and Their Impacts on Consumers
and Public Power 1 (2017) [hereinafter APPA, Issue Brief], http://www.publicpower.org/
system/files/documents/rto_capacity_markets_and_their_impacts_on_consumers_and_
public_power_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/AU5T-3WRV]. MISO administers a shorter-term
capacity market for certain generators. See Himanshu Pande & Rachel Green, ICF Int’l,
MISO’s Capacity Auction: Uncertainty Going Forward 2 (2015), http://
www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/MISO_Capacity_Auction.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8L7G-EMJ3]. FERC recently rejected a MISO proposal for a three-year
forward capacity market. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Order Rejecting Tariff
Filing, 158 FERC ¶ 61,128 (Feb. 2, 2017), 2017 WL 465973, at *1.
58. This Article uses “generators” for simplicity, but market participation also extends
to producers of resources capable of generating “negawatts”—that is, those producers who
can promise reductions in electricity demand can bid into these markets alongside supply-
side generation resources. See Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale
Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,657, 16,659 (Mar. 15, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35) (requiring market operators to compensate providers of “negawatts” equally to
supply-side resources); see also FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 773
(2016) (upholding this order); Joel B. Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations:
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a promise to have available for the market a certain amount of generat-
ing capacity three years in the future, and the region procures enough
future capacity to meet future projected demand.59 In theory at least,
these markets ensure long-term reliability by providing generators a
second potential stream of revenue—in addition to earnings from the
energy market—around which to make investment decisions.60
In both energy and capacity markets, RTOs run an auction process
to determine which energy resources to purchase. Generators bid in at
the price they would accept, and the RTO then “stacks” these bids, “first
accepting the lowest bids and then moving up and accepting higher bids
until all demand [for electricity] is satisfied.”61 All accepted bids are then
paid the highest bid that “cleared” the auction.62 This “stacking” process
creates incentives for generators to bid as low as they can afford to
ensure that their generation clears the market and gets paid.63 In focus-
ing solely on bid prices, the markets remain “agnostic as to resource and
fuel types, so they do not favor one technology over another.”64 Because
Market Pathways and Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 351,
408–09 (2017) (discussing FERC’s reasoning behind the order).
59. See N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 82 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining the
process by which RTOs ensure there is enough capacity “to function at peak load”). In this
way, “demand” in these markets is determined by regulators’ “technocratic guesses.”
Kavulla, supra note 56.
60. Compare APPA, Issue Brief, supra note 57, at 1 (arguing that capacity markets
increase prices without providing attendant benefits), with Peter Maloney, Marginal
Success, Insight: U.S. Power Markets 49 (2013), http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.
Content%5Caboutplatts%5Cmediacenter%5Cpdf%5Cinsightdec13_uspower.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7QPQ-BPUG] (arguing that capacity markets have “so far achieved their aim”).
61. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss at 14, Coal. for
Competitive Elec., Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 16-
CV-8164 (VEC)), 2017 WL 4837993, at 6; see also Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 768
(“Operators accept the generators’ bids in order of cost (least expensive first) until they
satisfy the [utilities’] total demand.”).
62. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss, supra note 61,
at 6; see also Brief of PJM Interconnection, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to
Motions to Dismiss at 6, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, No. 1:17-CV-01164 (N.D. Ill. Jul.
14, 2017), 2017 WL 5898038 [hereinafter PJM Amicus]. This explanation of market clear-
ing is simplified. In practice, dispatch decisions also take into account where on the grid
resources and demand are located, such that pricing is location specific. See Sacramento
Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining locational mar-
ginal pricing); Hammond & Spence, supra note 55, at 155.
63. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss, supra note 61; see
also Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1293–94 (2016) (“[Utilities]
generally bid their capacity into the auction at a price of $0, thus guaranteeing that the
capacity will clear at any price. . . . Because the fixed costs of building generating facilities
often vastly exceed the variable costs of producing electricity, many generators also func-
tion as price takers.”).
64. PJM Amicus, supra note 62, at 7. Some suggest that the markets are less neutral in
practice, because they impose certain barriers to entry on nontraditional types of
resources. See, e.g., Suzanne Herel, Clean Energy Advocates Appeal FERC’s Capacity
Performance Rulings, RTO Insider (July 12, 2016), http://www.rtoinsider.com/enviros-
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of the efficiencies presumed to flow from this market design, FERC has
declared prices established by these markets to be presumptively “just
and reasonable,” such that participation in the market takes the place of
the traditional requirement to file rates with FERC.65
The fact that FERC’s “wholesale” jurisdiction now revolves largely
around regionally administered electricity markets66 means that states
deciding whether to join RTOs face a choice between these unusual mar-
kets and more traditional regulation.67 States can either continue to man-
age their electricity supply through government oversight and planning,
or they can place their faith in regionally administered markets to deliver
reliable, affordable power. States that have opted to place their faith in
markets have done so believing “that it would benefit consumers by lead-
ing to lower costs and lower prices in both the short run and the long
run.”68
Now, however, many of the states that chose to participate in
regional markets have become increasingly aware of the limits of these
markets when it comes to achieving goals beyond least-cost electricity.69
Particularly with respect to climate change, which the markets do not
factor into their dispatch algorithms, states have had to take matters into
their own hands.
ferc-pjm-capacity-performance-28701/ [http://perma.cc/9XVK-5QRU]; see also Electric
Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and
Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 86,522, 86,522 (Nov. 17, 2016) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (proposing regulations to “remove barriers to the participa-
tion of electric storage resources and distributed energy resource aggregations in the
capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets operated by [RTOs and ISOs]”).
65. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 535–
37 (2008). More specifically, FERC has established that rates determined by the market are
presumptively “just and reasonable” for any generator that it determines has “adequately
mitigated market power, lacks the capacity to erect other barriers to entry, and has avoided
giving preferences to its affiliates.” See id. at 537; see also Spence, Can Law Manage?,
supra note 43, at 781.
66. To be clear, FERC nominally maintains the same jurisdiction in areas of the coun-
try that have not restructured. However, as was the case nationwide prerestructuring, its
jurisdiction extends to fewer transactions in these regions.
67. Note that these “markets” themselves require substantial regulatory oversight of
more novel varieties. See Lester Lave et al., Deregulation/Restructuring Part I:
Reregulation Will Not Fix the Problems 16 (2007), http://www.cmu.edu/gdi/docs/
deregulation-restructuring-part-i.pdf [http://perma.cc/6Q6Q-B2JY] (“The wholesale gen-
eration market has not actually been deregulated or even seen less regulation. . . . If
anything, there are more layers of regulation now.”).
68. Joskow, supra note 40, at 2; see also Blumsack, supra note 50, at 148 (“With the
introduction of RTO markets, the generation resources over a number of utility control
areas are cost-optimized and dispatched jointly.”).
69. For a thorough explanation of these limits, see generally Hammond & Spence,
supra note 55 (describing the tension between market competitiveness and pursuit of
environmental goals in the energy industry).
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B. State Climate Policies
Leading states have approached the challenge of regulating climate
change with a level of commitment far beyond what would be predicted
by any sort of rational-choice calculus.70 Even as the federal government
retreats on climate change,71 certain states are responding bullishly. Most
notably, California, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Vermont, and Oregon have passed laws or promulgated exec-
utive orders that establish state greenhouse gas reduction targets of
between 75% and 80% by 2050.72 Twenty states in total have greenhouse
gas targets,73 and every state has some policies in place to reduce carbon
emissions.74
Policy strategies span an enormous gamut. States are using cap-and-
trade programs;75 renewable-energy procurement requirements;76 rebates
and tax incentives for individuals, businesses, and communities;77 and novel
electricity pricing schemes.78 In some instances, they are also considering
70. As Professor Kirsten H. Engel has noted:
[I]t defies economic logic that small subglobal jurisdictions, such as state
and local governments in the United States, should be doing much of
anything to mitigate their comparatively minor contribution to a global
environmental phenomenon. Standard economic theory . . . would
argue that small individual exploiters of the commons (here the global
atmosphere) have little incentive to reduce the degree of their
exploitation for the good of the whole in the absence of an agreement
to do so that is binding on all commons users.
Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 54, 55 (2005).
71. See Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,093–95 (Mar. 31, 2017)
(revoking several of President Obama’s climate-related actions and ordering further
review of various environmental regulations).
72. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets, Ctr. for Climate & Energy Sols., http://
www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-maps/emissions-targets [http://perma.cc/2HCQ-
T69N] (last updated Sept. 2016).
73. Id.
74. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, N.C. Clean Energy
Tech. Ctr., http://www.dsireusa.org [http://perma.cc/65LA-3W8Q] [hereinafter DSIRE
Database] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). Although, note that in some states, policies assisting
in reducing carbon pollution may not be explicitly framed around “climate change” as a
goal.
75. See Cap-and-Trade Program, Cal. Air Res. Bd., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/capandtrade.htm [http://perma.cc/TKN8-T4P3] (last visited Mar. 2, 2018);
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), http://www.rggi.org [http://perma.cc/
5WNL-GG4A] [hereinafter RGGI] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018) (detailing a cap-and-trade
agreement among Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
76. See infra notes 81–98 and accompanying text.
77. See DSIRE Database, supra note 74 (collecting and sorting “incentives by type,”
including numerous tax and other financial incentives).
78. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Time of Use Rulemaking/R.15-12-012, CA.gov,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=12180 [http://perma.cc/VT9P-YU7Z] (last visited
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overhauling the utility business model and the way they regulate utili-
ties. 79 A complete canvass of these state policies would occupy the
remaining space of this Article, without contributing anything novel.80
Instead, this section examines three popular state climate policies that
have been the most controversial for the ways in which they intersect with
regional electricity markets: renewable portfolio standards, direct pro-
curement orders, and “zero-emissions credits” for nuclear generators.
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) are one of the most popular
state tools for promoting low-carbon energy sources. Twenty-nine states
currently have an RPS in place.81 These laws require82 utilities in the state
to source a certain percentage of the electricity that they sell from renew-
able sources by a certain date.83 This approach enables utilities to seek
out the cheapest renewable energy available to satisfy the state mandate.84
Typically, states track compliance with their RPS by issuing “Renewable
Energy Credits” (RECs) to renewable energy generators, which utilities
then purchase to prove that the requisite share of their energy has come
from renewable sources.85 RECs thus help create a more liquid market
Jan. 17, 2018) (“This effort will include development of the principles, methodologies,
and data sources needed to identify [time-of-use] periods that better reflect actual and
near-term expected electricity supply and demand.”).
79. See Herman K. Trabish, More than 30 States Embrace Grid Modernization, New
Policy Tracker Finds, Util. Dive (May 31, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/more-than-
30-states-embrace-grid-modernization-new-policy-tracker-finds/443702 [http://perma.cc/FV8S-
Y7NH].
80. See Mormann, supra note 36, at 1625 (describing how “[i]n the absence of com-
prehensive federal policy action on climate change and clean energy, states are increas-
ingly stepping in to fill the policy void” (footnote omitted)). For examples of state climate
policies, see David R. Hodas, State Initiatives, in Global Climate Change and U.S. Law 303
(Michael B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. 2014) (providing an overview of state
initiatives adopted to address climate change, “explicitly or indirectly through energy
regulation, transportation-related initiatives, or energy building codes”); Rossi, Carbon
Taxation, supra note 8, at 279–80 (explaining how states use traditional utility regulation,
specifically customer rate subsidies in energy law, to advance carbon reduction goals). See
generally Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In
Tariffs, 32 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 311 (2012) [hereinafter Davies, Reconciling] (arguing states
should blend both renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs in designing their
renewable-energy policies).
81. Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, Database of State Incentives for
Renewables & Efficiency, N.C. Clean Energy Tech. Ctr. (2017) [hereinafter Renewable
Portfolio Standard Policies], http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/03/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ZMN-GZEE].
82. Eight additional states have renewable portfolio “goals” but not requirements. Id.
83. Mormann, supra note 36, at 1624. In some cases, state law specifies an absolute
quantity. See, e.g., Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, supra note 81 (showing Texas
with an RPS of 5,880 megawatts by 2015).
84. Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 Conn.
L. Rev. 1339, 1357 (2010) [hereinafter Davies, Power Forward].
85. Id. at 1359–60; see also Todd Jones et al., Ctr. for Res. Sols., The Legal Basis for
Renewable Energy Certificates 3 (2015) (“Thirty-six (36) U.S. states and territories recog-
nize that RECs can be used to track and transact renewable electricity on the grid.”). REC
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for renewable energy by allowing the “renewable” attribute to be sold
separately from the underlying energy.86
In the most ambitious states, RPSs require a substantial percentage
of renewables: In New York and California, this percentage is 50% by
2030; in Vermont, 75% by 2032.87 In 2015, Hawaii adopted a 100% target
by 2045.88 In total, state RPS policies have driven more than half the
growth in U.S. renewable energy generation to date and are expected to
drive another 50% growth in the sector by 2030—making them an enor-
mously important state climate policy.89
Each state RPS defines qualifying renewable resources in its own way,
sometimes by enumerating a list,90 and other times more conceptually.
For example, Vermont’s definition of renewables includes any “technol-
ogy that relies on a resource that is being consumed at a harvest rate at
or below its natural regeneration rate.”91 Some states use these schemes
to express more idiosyncratic preferences tailored to local conditions.92
trading is often limited to either in-state or in-region. Cf. Robin Kundis Craig,
Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate Renewable
Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 771, 795 (2010) (“[A]t the state level,
RPS requirements that favor instate RECs or forbid out-of-state RECs could run afoul of
the dormant Commerce Clause. Similarly, multistate agreements that allow REC trading
within the consortium but prohibit RECs from other states could raise constitutional
concerns.”).
86. Joel H. Mack et al., All RECs Are Local: How In-State Generation Requirements
Adversely Affect Development of a Robust REC Market, Elec. J., May 2011, at 8, 10; see also
Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2017) (explaining RECs); Kelly
Crandall, Comment, Trust and the Green Consumer: The Fight for Accountability in
Renewable Energy Credits, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 893, 904 (2010) (same). FERC has explicitly
endorsed the existence of RECs as creations of state law that can legally exist apart from
the underlying electricity bought and sold. See WSPP Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061 (Apr. 20,
2012), 2012 WL 1395532, at *5.
87. Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, supra note 81. Direct comparison of these
standards can be challenging—one must know precisely what resources are included,
whether or not renewables that existed before passage of the RPS are included, and what
the natural resource endowment of the state is like. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note
84, at 1361.
88. Act of June 8, 2015, 2015 Haw. Sess. Laws 245; see also Renewable Portfolio
Standard Policies, supra note 81; About the Hawaii Clean Energy Initiative, http://
www.hawaiicleanenergyinitiative.org/about-the-hawaii-clean-energy-initiative [http://
perma.cc/QG3D-NVFP] (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
89. Galen Barbose, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., U.S. Renewables Portfolio
Standards: 2016 Annual Status Report 2 (2016), http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-
1005057.pdf [http://perma.cc/D55H-V9VS].
90. See, e.g., In re Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard, 235 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 414 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 2004) (defining eligible resources as biogas
(including anaerobic digestion and landfill gas), biomass, fuel cells, hydro (without new
storage impoundment), solar, tidal/ocean, and wind).
91. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 8002(21) (2016).
92. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 84, at 1360–62 (discussing differences in
terms of four core RPS design traits); Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable
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Maryland, for instance, includes electricity produced from chicken
manure in its RPS, while North Carolina includes electricity from hog
waste.93 Numerous states also establish “tiers” or “carve-outs” within their
RPSs, which mandate a certain amount of the overall requirement to
come from particular resource types. Twenty-two of the twenty-nine states
with RPSs have a carve-out relating either to solar energy or “distributed
generation”—a term used to describe small-scale generating resources
located at or near the site of consumption.94
In some states, legislatures have created additional procurement
processes for certain clean-energy resources above and beyond the RPS.95
For example, in 2016, Massachusetts passed “An Act Relative to Energy
Diversity,” which requires utilities in the state to enter into long-term
contracts for 1,600 megawatts of offshore wind energy.96 The state has
also joined California in mandating that utilities acquire a certain
amount of energy-storage resources.97 Several other northeastern states
also have special procurement processes for additional renewable
resources.98
Finally, there is perhaps the most controversial policy of them all:
state support for particular nuclear plants at risk of retiring. New York
Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 Duke Envtl.
L. & Pol’y F. 125, 144–50 (2010) (cataloguing different state RPSs).
93. See Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 7-701(j), (m) (LexisNexis 2016) (defining poul-
try litter, which is used in thermal biomass systems); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.8(e) (2015)
(establishing a specific requirement for swine waste).
94. Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) with Solar or Distributed Generation
Provisions, Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, N.C. Clean Energy
Tech. Ctr. (2017), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/
02/RPS_carveout_4.pdf [http://perma.cc/EYJ9-QEAV] (mapping which states have solar-
or distributed-generation provisions).
95. Two recent articles clarify why a state might layer procurement policies on top of
an RPS. See Davies, Reconciling, supra note 80, at 313 (discussing how RPSs and other
incentives can complement each other); Mormann, supra note 36, at 1658–59 (proposing
a model for integrating RPSs and feed-in tariffs). As Davies and Mormann explain, RPS
and procurement policies can be blended to create, on the one hand, substantial demand
for renewable energy and, on the other hand, assurance to investors of certain returns
over a longer period of time. Davies, Reconciling, supra note 80, at 314; Mormann, supra
note 36, at 1628.
96. An Act to Promote Energy Diversity, 2016 Mass. Acts, http://malegislature.gov/
Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2016/Chapter188 [http://perma.cc/53RC-PJWA] (last visited Apr.
4, 2018). Some states alternatively include a carve-out for offshore wind within their RPS.
Benjamin Storrow, Mid-Atlantic Enters “Offshore Game” in a Big Way, ClimateWire (May
12, 2017), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/05/12/stories/1060054457 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
97. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking No. 10-12-007, Decision Adopting Energy
Storage Procurement Framework and Design Program (2013); Peter Maloney,
Massachusetts DOER Will Set Energy Storage Mandate Targets by July, Util. Dive (Jan. 3,
2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/massachusetts-doer-will-set-energy-storage-mandate-
targets-by-july/433138/ [http://perma.cc/PB9Q-XD32].
98. See infra note 264 (gathering cases explaining and evaluating these policies).
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pioneered this strategy with its Public Service Commission’s 2016 decision
to provide payments, per megawatt hour, to three nuclear units in New
York State that it determined were at risk of retiring without state aid.99
The state awards these units “Zero-Emission Credits” (ZECs) for each
megawatt hour of energy they produce through the year 2029.100 New
York utilities are required to purchase these ZECs, with their price
determined by the “Social Cost of Carbon”—a figure calculated by the
Obama Administration.101 The ZEC price for the first two years of the
program is around $17.50 per megawatt hour; after that time, the ZEC
price may decline based on forecasted prices in wholesale markets.102
Several states have either followed or are considering following simi-
lar courses. Illinois adopted a ZEC program in December 2016, which
looks quite similar to New York’s.103 Both states have quickly faced law-
suits challenging the legality of the programs under the Federal Power
Act’s framework of shared federal–state jurisdiction.104 The lawsuits have
not, however, deterred Connecticut, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey
from seeking to enact similar programs.105
Altogether, the suite of policies that states have amassed to meet
their decarbonization goals is both impressive and eclectic—to some
delightfully so; to others, frustratingly so.106 In the next Part, this Article
analyzes and defends these diverse climate policies and the preferences
they represent. First, though, it is helpful to understand the problems that
detractors believe these state policies present to regional electricity markets.
99. See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n to
Implement a Large-Scale Renewable Program & a Clean Energy Standard, 331 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 357 (Aug. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Clean Energy Standard Order] (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
100. Id. at 144–45.
101. Id. at 149–50. President Trump has since withdrawn the findings of the
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, describing them as “no
longer representative of governmental policy.” Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093,
16,093–95 (Mar. 31, 2017).
102. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 99, at 51.
103. See 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3855/1–75(d–5) (West Supp. 2017); id. at 3855/1–
10; State Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6, Elec. Power
Supply Ass’n v. Star, No. 1:17-CV-01164 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 14, 2017), 2017 WL 5898040 (describ-
ing Illinois’s program).
104. See infra notes 251–257 and accompanying text.
105. Ken Dixon, Malloy Signs Millstone Nuclear Bill, Conn. Post (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Malloy-signs-Millstone-nuclear-bill-12320251.php
[http://perma.cc/5UX9-MJLU]; Marie Cusick, Lawmakers Mull Support for Nuclear
Industry, NPR: StateImpact Pa. (Apr. 26, 2017), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/
2017/04/26/lawmakers-mull-support-for-nuclear-industry [http://perma.cc/7BX2-2JBD];
Peter Maloney, Ohio Lawmakers Introduce Bill To Support FirstEnergy’s Nuclear Plants,
Util. Dive (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ohio-lawmakers-introduce-bill-
to-support-firstenergys-nuclear-plants/439950/ [http://perma.cc/MF5F-EF6D].
106. See infra section I.C (explaining the divergent viewpoints on the advisability of
these state policies).
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C. Tensions at the Intersection
State climate policies and regional electricity markets have coex-
isted—and indeed, grown together—for around two decades.107 Why the
recent fuss? Regional market operator PJM—an RTO that spans the mid-
Atlantic—offers perhaps the most parsimonious explanation for the present
spate of concern: “Subsidies are contagious.”108 By “subsidies,” PJM is ref-
erencing the myriad state policies detailed above that help promote various
clean-energy resources. As this quote suggests, regional electricity-market
operators are nervous about the proliferation of these state-level, resource-
specific policies as a means to achieve ambitious climate-mitigation goals.
The first common complaint about these state policies is that pay-
ments to specific zero-carbon resources unfairly suppress market prices.
For example, plaintiffs suing to contest the legality of New York’s ZEC
program explain their concerns as follows: Providing existing nuclear
units an out-of-market ZEC payment enables these nuclear plants to
lower the price at which they bid into the market.109 Then, the clearing
price of the entire market is lowered such that other plants that do not
receive subsidies either fail to clear the auctions or clear at a lower price.
Consequently, the argument goes, “the ZEC program . . . distorts the
functioning of the FERC-regulated energy and capacity markets.”110 Sim-
ilar complaints extend to other state support policies, such as RPS and
specific procurement policies, which some believe “cause a similar type
of harm to . . . markets.”111
107. See Tierney, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 52, at 2 (observing the prev-
alence of state policies that can affect wholesale market prices); see also Robert Klee,
Comm’r, Conn. Dep’t of Energy & Envtl. Prot., Statement at FERC Technical Conference:
State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York
Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 1 (May 1–2, 2017),
http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170426145943-Klee,%20Connecticut%20DEEP.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9CVL-GM3C] (noting that in 1998, Connecticut enacted clean-energy
policies contemporaneously with legislation deregulating electricity).
108. Monitoring Analytics, LLC, State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume 2:
Detailed Analysis 2 (2017) [hereinafter Monitoring Analytics, State of the Market Report],
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2016/2016-som-
pjm-volume2.pdf [http://perma.cc/UAJ9-YY3A].
109. See Complaint at 19–23, Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d
554 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 16-CV-8164 (VEC))(describing New York’s subsidy scheme); see
also Robert C. Flexon, President & CEO, Dynegy Inc., Pre-Conference Remarks at FERC
Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New
England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., at 2 (May 1–2, 2017) [hereinafter Dynegy, FERC Technical Conference],
http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170426151233-Flexon,%20Dynegy.pdf [http://
perma.cc/CV5N-L53M] (“In RTO/ISO markets, a generator relies on the combination of
energy and capacity revenues to recover its costs. A generator’s offer to supply energy
and/or capacity is typically tied to its cost[s] . . . the ZECs will enable the nuclear
generators to make offers well below their production costs.”).
110. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss, supra note 61, at 7.
111. PJM Amicus, supra note 62, at 9.
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Perhaps the most contested element of this narrative is the norma-
tive claim that the market is “distorted” and “harmed,” rather than merely
altered, by these kinds of state policies. An alternative view is that it is
perfectly legitimate for states to support certain resources and that such
support does not render these resources’ market bids “uneconomic.”112
To the contrary, this view holds, state support policies are permissible
judgment calls by states that exist at “the heart of their historic juris-
diction over generation resources.”113 If they affect market prices, so be
it—there’s nothing necessarily wrong with that. Indeed, subsidies to fossil
fuels have long affected their relative competitiveness in ways that the
market has not accounted for.114
Moving beyond these semantics—and the substantially different
views they represent of the relative hierarchy of market functioning and
state policy goals—can be challenging. Complaints about state clean-
energy policies lowering market prices often feel like their own protec-
tionist effort to insulate carbon-heavy resources from necessary change.
But the most compelling version of this argument looks further down the
road than mere market “distortion.” That longer-term argument pro-
ceeds like this: States decided to join regional electricity markets to have
these markets competitively select least-cost electricity and generating
capacity. Going forward, states plan to continue to rely on these markets
to send signals about whether and when to invest in new generating
capacity in any particular region. But if state policies in support of cer-
tain resources lower the prices those markets are sending to everyone
else, then it may well be the case that non-policy-supported generators—
112. Jennifer Chen, Sustainable FERC Project, Statement at FERC Technical
Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc.,
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 2 (May
1–2, 2017) [hereinafter Chen, FERC Technical Conference], http://www.ferc.gov/
CalendarFiles/20170426151027-Chen,%20Natural%20Resources%20Defense%20Council.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9T47-PNA5]; see also Lisa G. McAlister, Am. Mun. Power, Pre-
Conference Statement at FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale
Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator,
Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 3 (May 1–2, 2017) [hereinafter American
Municipal Power, FERC Technical Conference], http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20170426151448-McAlister,%20American%20Municipal%20Power.pdf [http://perma.cc/
NAU5-EHMY] (“An effort to distinguish between state actions that are ‘inside’ versus
‘outside’ the market would be misplaced.”).
113. Robert Erwin, Gen. Counsel, Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Comments at FERC
Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New
England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., at 4 (May 1–2, 2017) [hereinafter Erwin, FERC Technical Conference],
http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170426150720-Erwin,%20Maryland%20PSC.pdf
[http://perma.cc/PQR3-KQJD].
114. See Rossi, Carbon Taxation, note 8, at 287 n.49 (“Studies that incorporate envi-
ronmental and energy security costs associated with fossil fuels in the United States esti-
mate that annual direct and indirect subsidies exceed $121 billion (in 1999 dollars).”).
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in particular, natural gas generators115—no longer see value in building
new plants.116
This result, in and of itself, might be exactly what states desire: Their
policies push out existing, carbon-emitting resources by supporting cer-
tain zero-carbon resources. But here’s where PJM’s worry about
subsidies’ contagiousness comes into play: Renewable energy, nuclear
energy, and natural gas have different attributes that lead them not to be
perfectly interchangeable electricity sources. Solar and wind energy are
available only when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing, respectively.
Nuclear power cannot be turned on and off quickly—meaning that it is
not very useful in balancing out the variability in solar and wind.117
Natural gas and hydropower, by contrast, are capable of quickly
“ramping” up and down, such that they act as flexible complements to
these variable resources.118 Electricity storage can play a similar role in
“smoothing” out electricity supply.119
115. See Paul Hibbard et al., Analysis Grp., Electricity Markets, Reliability and the
Evolving U.S. Power System 15 (2017) (noting combined-cycle, natural gas combustion
turbines are “the technology of choice for new fossil-fueled generation investment in most
regions”); see also Raymond L. Gifford et al., The Breakdown of the Merchant Generation
Business Model: A Clear-Eyed View of Risks and Realities Facing Merchants 7 exh.6 (2017)
[hereinafter Gifford et al., Merchant Report].
116. See, e.g., ISO New England Inc. Pre-Conference Statement at FERC Technical
Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc.,
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 1 (May
1–2, 2017) [hereinafter ISO-NE, FERC Technical Conference], http://www.ferc.gov/
CalendarFiles/20170426150054-White,%20ISO-NE.pdf [http://perma.cc/U6S8-GRVL]
(suggesting that subsidized “out-of-market procurements could undermine cost-effective
price formation, in turn impacting both [the ISO-NE capacity market’s] ability to attract
unsubsidized new investment cost effectively and investors’ willingness to maintain existing
supply resources”); see also NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 111 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (observing that these challenges could ultimately lead to “brownouts or blackouts”);
Gifford et al., Merchant Report, supra note 115, at 1; ISO New England, 2016 Economic
Study: NEPOOL Scenario Analysis (First Draft) 5 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“New resources will require sources of revenue in addition to the wholesale
energy market to remain economically viable. Natural gas units show the greatest revenue
shortfall [because] of their production costs being higher than the $0/MWh fuel costs of
renewables, but renewable resources also show significant revenue shortfalls.”).
117. See MIT, The Future of the Electric Grid: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study 53–76
(2011) (discussing the challenges of depending upon variable energy sources).
118. Id. at 64; see also Hammond & Spence, supra note 55, at 164.
119. See Judy W. Chang et al., Brattle Grp., Advancing Past “Baseload” to a Flexible
Grid: How Grid Planners and Power Markets Are Better Defining System Needs to Achieve
a Cost-Effective and Reliable Supply Mix 17 (2017), http://files.brattle.com/files/7352_
advancing_past_baseload_to_a_flexible_grid.pdf [http://perma.cc/FS9T-RZV6] (explaining
the role that “flexible resources” can play in “help[ing] to integrate variable renewable
resources”); Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for
Energy Storage, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 697, 710–12 (2014) (“[R]eliability benefits can come
in the form of backup electricity in times of power outages, enhanced power quality to
prevent outage, and frequency regulation that adjusts for differences between grid
operators’ predictions and actual demand.”).
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These divergent characteristics underpin the “contagion” worry. As
renewable energy comes to play a larger role in the grid, states may
realize that they need a certain amount of natural gas, electricity storage,
or some other new resource to keep their decarbonizing grid running
smoothly and efficiently.120 In this case, if the market is incapable of
supporting such resources, states may end up having to also design
subsidy programs for these resources.121 Eventually, the market might be
so poor at sending competitive price signals that the only way for any
resource to remain viable122 would be to obtain state subsidies.123 Such a
result would ultimately amount to creeping, accidental re-regulation of the
electricity sector and abandonment of the gains states intended to obtain
from regional electricity markets.124
120. Cf. Abraham Silverman, Deputy Gen. Counsel & Vice President, Regulatory, at
NRG Energy, Inc., Pre-Technical Conference Statement at FERC Technical Conference:
State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York
Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 2 (May 1–2, 2017)
[hereinafter NRG Energy, FERC Technical Conference], http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20170426151513-Silverman,%20NRG.pdf [http://perma.cc/6M75-V8AE] (explaining that to
succeed in decarbonizing the grid, “the power sector must be ruthlessly efficient in
attracting and deploying capital”).
121. See Michael Hogan, Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP), Hitting the Mark on
Missing Money: How to Ensure Reliability at Least Cost to Consumers 7 (2016),
http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/rap-hogan-hitting-mark-missing-
money-2016-september.pdf [http://perma.cc/QGG6-9YWU] (explaining that markets
increasingly will need flexible resources as renewables’ penetration increases and that
these flexible resources are missing the necessary “remuneration of investment”);
Monitoring Analytics, State of the Market Report, supra note 108, at 2 (providing detailed
analytics assessing proposed subsidy solutions); David B. Spence, Paradoxes of
“Decarbonization,” 82 Brook. L. Rev. 447, 470 (2017) [hereinafter Spence, Paradoxes]
(observing that a recognition that natural gas will be a necessary backup fuel on an all-
renewables grid “begs the question[] [of] who will own and build natural gas-fired power
plants that will almost never be used”).
122. Emily Hammond and David Spence do an excellent job explaining why market
prices may fail to provide adequate returns on investment to plant owners. See Spence &
Hammond, supra note 55, at 163.
123. See PJM Amicus, supra note 62, at 8 (“Lower clearing prices . . . starve otherwise
economic existing generation, beginning a vicious cycle that requires these plants also to
look for out-of-market subsidies, further depressing clearing prices and undermining the
market price.”).
124. See Dynegy, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 109, at 5 (explaining that
“[r]ecent state-level interventions have had a devastating effect on the ability of unsubsi-
dized market participants to attract and retain private capital”); Tierney, FERC Technical
Conference, supra note 52, at 6 (suggesting this result would “affect the continuing viabil-
ity of the current designs of these three RTOs’ forward capacity markets”); Gavin Bade,
Re-Regulation on the Horizon? State Plant Subsidies Point to Looming ‘Crisis’ in
Organized Power Markets, Util. Dive (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/re-
regulation-vertically-integrated-utility/428639/ [http://perma.cc/YG54-HDR8] (arguing
that “[w]ithout concerted action to alter market constructs . . . states will turn back to a
vertically-integrated utility model”). Indeed, one might interpret DOE’s NOPR proposing
cost-of-service ratemaking for fuel-secure resources as a glaring example of precisely this
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Whether this potentiality presents an imminent threat remains a
matter of debate. For the moment, the worry is particularly acute in the
eastern RTOs that rely on regional forward capacity markets as the pri-
mary way to ensure resource adequacy (that is, enough electricity going
forward to keep the lights on). In these regions, states have largely
required utilities to sell off their generation assets, such that corporations
building generators do not have the benefit of a captive monopoly rate
base125 to help pay for new plants.126 Instead, these generators rely exclu-
sively on payments from electricity markets as the way to recoup their
investments, such that a depression in market prices threatens their
survival to a greater extent than in other markets.
Although state reregulation of the electricity sector is sometimes
held out as a plausible solution to these challenges, no state pursuing
aggressive decarbonization expresses reregulation as its aim.127 Instead,
states wish to remain a part of regional electricity markets while also
accomplishing their decarbonization goals.128 Accordingly, the key question
becomes how to balance the aims of these policies with the risks they
type of “creeping subsidy.” See Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940
(proposed Oct. 10, 2017) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
125. In regulated regions, approved capital expenditures make up a utility’s “rate base.”
The utility is entitled to recover the costs reflected in the rate base as well as a reasonable rate
of return, typically around ten percent per year. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602–03 (1944) (establishing the governing standard for whether rates are
“just and reasonable”); see also Edison Elec. Inst., Q4 2015 Rate Case Summary 1 (2016),
http://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/industrydataanalysis/industryfinancialanalysis/
QtrlyFinancialUpdates/Documents/QFU_Rate_Case/2015_Q4_Rate_Case.pdf [http://
perma.cc/QK53-SV8K] (finding that the average return on equity in the fourth quarter of
2015 was 9.62%, “a near-record low in . . . over-three-decades of data”).
126. In other RTOs, states maintain a more direct role in ensuring resource adequacy
by approving certain generation resources for construction and assuring utilities a fair rate
of return on these assets. See PJM Amicus, supra note 62, at 3 (explaining these regional
differences); Spence, Paradoxes, supra note 121, at 464–65 (arguing the “problem of
attracting private capital lies at the heart of public utility regulation, and hangs like a
shadow over hybrid and competitive markets”); Tierney, FERC Technical Conference,
supra note 52, at 2–3 (explaining why regions where states maintain a traditionally regu-
lated utility industry are less impacted by these concerns).
127. LaFleur, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 16, at 54–55 (summarizing the
view of state representatives, who “in general still want the centralized market to play some
role in resources for liability and sustaining existing resources for reliability” and who were
not “going to take over buying all the resources at the state level”).
128. See ISO-NE, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 116, at 1 (explaining that
“New England states have not expressed interest” in returning to a situation in which they
fully control resource adequacy); see also Susanne Desroches, Deputy Dir., Infrastructure
Policy, N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency, Pre-Conference Comments at
FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New
England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., at 5 (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170426150357-
DesRoches,%20New%20York%20City.pdf [http://perma.cc/68CN-FEX4] (“To be clear,
the City continues to see value in the wholesale markets, and it is not suggesting that we go
back to vertically integrated utilities.”).
2018] ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND DECARBONIZATION 1093
present to electricity-market functionality. Before taking up this question
in Parts III and IV, the next Part argues that the answer to this question
requires a deeper understanding of the nature of the project of decar-
bonization—an understanding that has largely been lacking in conversa-
tions to date.129
II. WHAT SHOULD WE ASK OF DECARBONIZATION?
PREFERENCES BEYOND LEAST COST
At one level, decarbonization is a technical challenge. To combat
climate change, the amount of carbon released in the production of elec-
tricity must be dramatically reduced. Leading studies suggest that ade-
quately mitigating climate change—that is, minimizing the possibility of
planetary catastrophe—will require “deep decarbonization” of developed
country economies.130 “Deep decarbonization” in this context describes
decarbonization efforts of around 80% by 2050—precisely the aim
embraced by leading U.S. states.131
Several recent projects have fleshed out the technological changes
necessary to accomplish this transformation. These projects yield answers
along the following lines: “The carbon intensity of electricity will need to
be reduced by a startling 97%.”132 To do so, “[p]etroleum, coal, and natu-
ral gas [must] play a much smaller role in the primary energy supply,”
and “wind, solar, biomass, and nuclear [must] become the dominant
share of primary energy supply.”133 These changes will, of course, “pro-
foundly transform the U.S. energy economy.”134 A more interesting and
open question, though, is how—and how much—these major infrastruc-
ture changes will reverberate throughout the American economy and
American society.
A. Two Visions of the Decarbonized Future
It can be difficult to trace the ways in which discrete energy-infra-
structure decisions affect larger social and political structures. It is often
only in hindsight, after the gradual accretion of decades of such decisions,
129. See Roopali Phadke, Public Deliberation and the Geographies of Wind Justice, 22
Sci. as Culture 247, 248 (2013) (“To date, new energy policy has focused on innovation
and investment pipelines. Remarkably, little attention has been paid to understanding the
social dimensions of these major infrastructure shifts.”).
130. The White House, United States Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization 6–
7 (2016), http://unfccc.int/files/focus/long-term_strategies/application/pdf/mid_century_
strategy_report-final_red.pdf [http://perma.cc/DH3A-7YTM]; Williams et al., Deep
Decarbonization Policy, supra note 6, at 11; see also John C. Dernbach, Pathways to a Zero-
Carbon Future, Envtl. F., July–Aug. 2017, at 30, 35.
131. Williams et al., Deep Decarbonization Policy, supra note 6, at 35.
132. Id. at 49.
133. Id. at 19–20.
134. Id. at 9.
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that we can understand how energy policies interrelate to larger ques-
tions of social structure and economic and political power.135 But part of
this Article’s argument is that it is important to appreciate up front—as
best we can—the expansive effects that our choices around how to
decarbonize the energy system are likely to have.
In an attempt to develop an appreciation of decarbonization’s
potentially widespread ramifications, this section asks the reader to con-
sider two divergent pathways to deep decarbonization. The first emerges
from a recent, personal conversation with an acquaintance who works for
a major environmental not-for-profit that will remain undisclosed.136 He
explained that, frustrated with recent backsliding on climate change in
the United States, his organization was quietly assembling a group of the
major fossil fuel companies in an attempt to devise a response to climate
change that would ensure that the companies maintained their domi-
nant role in the economy. That is to say, this group hoped to draft legisla-
tion related to decarbonization that would do as little as possible to shake
up market shares, or political power, within the energy industry or
beyond. In this group’s view, accepting a policy actively designed to fore-
stall any significant distributional shifts is the surest way to achieve rapid
deep decarbonization.
If this pathway were taken, the major political and economic players
in the decarbonized future might not look so different from those of
today—many of the changes would play out behind the scenes of the
electricity grid. All of us would get used to landscapes dotted by major
utility-scale wind farms, nuclear power plants, solar arrays, and transmis-
sion lines, owned by companies like Exxon and BP.137 Companies would
135. For a powerful demonstration of these interlinkages, see generally Timothy
Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (2011), which traces the
ways in which the switch from coal to oil as a dominant fuel impacted political economy
and political institutions in the Western world.
136. That makes this anecdote hard to cite. But it is not particularly important that it
can be externally validated—it is offered in the spirit of exploring “sociotechnical imagi-
naries,” as described by the scholar of science, technology, and society, Professor Sheila
Jasanoff. Sheila Jasanoff & Sang-Hyun Kim, Sociotechnical Imaginaries and National
Energy Policies, 22 Sci. as Culture 189, 190 (2013). These imaginaries, for Jasanoff, are
“‘collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and
fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects,’” as well as “powerful
cultural resources that help shape social responses to innovation.” Id. (quoting Sheila
Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and
Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea, 47 Minerva 119, 120 (2009)); see
also Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries 23 (2004) (defining “social imaginaries” as
“the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how
things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and
the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations”).
137. Several of the big oil companies are already moving in this direction. See, e.g.,
Anna Hirtenstein, Big Oil Follows Silicon Valley into Backing Green Energy Firms,
Bloomberg Tech. (Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-
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build whichever combination of these resources proved most profitable
to them. The price of electricity would likely rise, but companies such as
General Electric would provide new technologies to help control electric-
ity demand—technologies that would be available to those who could
afford them.138
Now, consider a second, quite different pathway that a country or
state could take toward decarbonization. This pathway emerges from the
thesis of journalist Naomi Klein’s 2014 book This Changes Everything.139 In
her view, the reason that the world has made so little progress on climate
change is that “the Right is Right”: Addressing climate change requires
actions that “directly challenge our reigning economic paradigm” and
“spell extinction for the richest and most powerful industry the world has
ever known—the oil and gas industry.”140 She doubts that any significant
solution can be forged through cooperation with major corporations,
citing the poor record of this strategy to date.141 Instead, she sees the
challenge of climate change as an opportunity to forge new grassroots
alliances that link climate change to community health and that demand
more democratic decisionmaking and local economic power.142 Climate
change, in this view, “could be the catalyst to attack inequality at its core.”143
If this pathway toward decarbonization were pursued, there might
be an efflorescence of city movements to reclaim their electricity grids
from private ownership.144 Communities would collectively invest in locally
sited solar and wind farms, deciding to pay more to support local clean
energy and local jobs. Consumption of energy and other goods might fall
as the country pursued low-growth economic policies that focused on
delivering free time instead of material accumulation, in an effort to
spread fewer resources more broadly.145 Significant lifestyle changes might
be required, including reduced consumption of meat and dairy, less car
ownership, and fewer airplane trips.146
15/big-oil-follows-silicon-valley-into-backing-green-energy-firms/ [http://perma.cc/XKT9-
3FFV].
138. See Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 571, 591–609 (2017)
(exploring the trend toward creating a “participatory grid” and the equity challenges it
presents).
139. Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate (2014).
140. Id. at 31, 63.
141. Id. at 207–49.
142. See id. at 96–97, 360–61.
143. Id. at 409.
144. See Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 267, 304–07 (2017)
[hereinafter Welton, Public Energy] (documenting efforts in this vein).
145. See, e.g., Tim Jackson, Prosperity Without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet
3, 151, 180 (2011) (asking “[w]hat can prosperity possibly look like in a finite world” and
concluding that it might include consuming less, improving social equality, and working
fewer hours).
146. See Mike Childs, Friends of the Earth, Just Transition: Is a Just Transition to a
Low-Carbon Economy Possible Within Safe Global Carbon Limits? 4 (2011), http://
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It is hard to get much further apart than these two visions of the
decarbonized future—one based entirely on political expediency and
maintenance of the economic order; the other based on a vision of using
the project of decarbonization to radically restructure political and social
relations. Their coexistence hints at the range of possibilities that decar-
bonization holds for power structures, community character, and daily
life. No matter how we approach it, decarbonization will shape more
than just physical infrastructure, making it a social project as much as a
technical one.
There is considerably more to be said about the many contours of
the “social project” of decarbonization, but much of it will have to wait
for future work. This Article does not attempt to explore the range of
potential considerations or solutions in their entirety, nor does it make
any judgment about the most viable or desirable version of this social
project. For the present argument, it is enough to understand that decar-
bonization is, inexorably, more than just a technical challenge. Discus-
sions around its trajectory implicate choices and values that extend far
beyond what technologies are available at what costs.147 The question
then becomes: Who determines what additional values are relevant? The
friendsoftheearth.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/just_transition.pdf [http://perma.cc/
H77H-FXET] (finding these sacrifices necessary if the United Kingdom were to meet
decarbonization goals while ensuring that “essential needs for housing, transport and
energy use are met”).
147. Many scholars outside the legal field have forcefully made similar points. See,
e.g., Govert Valkenburg & Giancarlo Cotella, Governance of Energy Transitions: About
Inclusion and Closure in Complex Sociotechnical Problems, 6 Energy Sustainability &
Soc’y (2016), http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1186%2Fs13705-016-0086-8.pdf
[http://perma.cc/R7LH-KET4] (describing the energy transition as “at once a tech-
nological, regulation and political problem” that implicates a “heterogeneity of relevant
values”); Catherine Butler et al., Public Values for Energy Futures: Framing,
Indeterminacy and Policy Making, 87 Energy Pol’y 665, 669 (2015) [hereinafter Butler et
al., Public Values] (finding that the public “situate[s] climate change as just one element
within a much wider set of concerns about environment and human/nature relations”);
Christina Demski et al., Public Values for Energy System Change, 34 Global Envtl. Change
59, 59 (2015) (“Publics are deeply implicated in energy transitions, for example as con-
sumers and producers of energy, as citizens with voting powers, or as active protesters and
proponents of energy infrastructures.”); Jasanoff & Kim, supra note 136, at 189
(“[R]adical changes in the fuel supply are likely to transform social infrastructures, chang-
ing established patterns of life and work and allocating benefits and burdens differently
from before.”); Clark A. Miller & Jennifer Richter, Social Planning for Energy Transitions,
1 Current Sustainable Renewable Energy Rep. 77, 78 (2014) (“[T]he rise of new energy
resources (or the end of old ones) can give rise to massive reconfiguration of social, envi-
ronmental, and technological landscapes . . . .”); Andre Silveira & Paul Pritchard, Univ. of
Cambridge Inst. for Sustainability Leadership, Justice in the Transition to a Low Carbon
Economy (2016) (unpublished working paper), http://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/publications/
publication-pdfs/justice-in-the-transition-to-a-low-carbon-economy.pdf [http://perma.cc/
CPY8-VNQT] (“A more explicit consideration of justice issues in the transition to a low
carbon economy is increasingly called for by both governmental and civil society actors in
national and international fora.”).
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sections that follow contend that state politics present a better avenue for
this determination than quasi-private, regional electricity markets.
B. State Policies as Reflections of the Social Project of Decarbonization
Although no state has embraced a vision of decarbonization near
either extreme described above, state responses to climate change simi-
larly evince an understanding of the significant political and value
choices bound up in decarbonization policy.
Take, for example, state variations in RPSs, which demonstrate pref-
erences for certain resources that are either locally abundant (for
example, Maryland’s chicken manure) or particularly desirable, but less
economically competitive (for example, rooftop solar carve-outs).148 In
both of these instances, states have chosen to promote certain aims
beyond “mere decarbonization”—that is, the lowest-cost decarbonization
achievable. 149 By including chicken manure in its RPS, Maryland
provided a potential additional stream of revenue to the state’s many
poultry farmers, while diverting nitrogen-rich poultry manure from
running off into the Chesapeake Bay—a body of water that has faced
significant problems of nitrogen overloading.150
By including solar and distributed generation carve-outs, states have
prioritized controlling both the type and scale of their clean-energy
build-out. A policy preference for distributed generation ensures that
renewable energy built in a state will not all occur in large-scale, utility- or
developer-led projects that consume open space. Instead, some of it will
be located on the roofs and in the yards of state residents, providing
them additional income streams and creating opportunities for new busi-
nesses to emerge in the electricity sphere.151 A built-in preference for
solar serves a different end: It ensures that all of a state’s renewable
energy will not come from the cheapest source—frequently wind—but
instead that state policy will work to promote multiple renewable energy
technologies.152
148. See supra section I.B.
149. Indeed, even the choice of a renewables requirement—as opposed to a broader
“clean energy” standard—illustrates a preference in this regard. Lincoln Davies catalogues
the many “ancillary benefits” an RPS can bring. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 84, at
1357–59.
150. See Dep’t of Legislative Servs. of Md. Gen. Assembly, Fiscal and Policy Note: S.B.
348, Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard—Tier 1 Renewable Source—Poultry Litter 4–5
(2008), http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rs/fnotes/bil_0008/sb0348.pdf [http://perma.cc/
VRQ8-L9GB].
151. See, e.g., Community Energy Solar, http://communityenergysolar.com/about
[http://perma.cc/73SW-BEUM] (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (noting that the company
focuses on community solar development).
152. See, e.g., About the Solar Carve-Out Program, Mass. Exec. Office of Energy &
Envtl. Affairs, http://www.mass.gov/eea/energy-utilities-clean-tech/renewable-energy/
solar/rps-solar-carve-out/about-the-rps-solar-carve-out-program.html [http://perma.cc/
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Direct procurement policies for particular resources serve a similar
purpose: They signal a commitment to developing a certain local clean-
energy industry. Massachusetts politicians celebrated the state’s 2016
legislation mandating offshore wind on this ground, proclaiming, for
example: “What we have here, as opposed to an amorphous bill of clean
energy generally or greenhouse gases generally, is a specific technology—
an offshore wind economy—that we’re hoping to jump start and we have
real incentives in place to make that happen.”153
New York tells a similar story about its ZEC program for nuclear
energy. The New York Public Service Commission asserts that without
support for nuclear, it would be exceedingly difficult for the state to
accomplish its RPS goal of 50% renewables by 2030.154 Although nuclear
power does not count towards this 50% goal, “[i]f the nuclear plants
were to retire before the renewable build-out occurs, the resulting gap in
the state’s power supply would lead to a surge in [greenhouse gas] emis-
sions as fossil-fuel-fired generators fill that gap.” 155 Accordingly, the
Commission has designed the ZEC as a time-limited measure to assist the
state in meeting its long-term decarbonization targets.156 It also decided
to provide nuclear energy a fixed level of support, pegged to predicted
wholesale market prices, rather than allow it to receive the fluctuating,
often more generous prices awarded to renewables.157 Illinois is even
SQ6J-56ZD] (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (articulating multiple goals for Massachusetts’s
solar carve-out program, including cultivating a long-term solar market in the state and
encouraging build-out of systems of various sizes, including residential, commercial, and
utility-scale).
153. Elise Harmon, In 2016, Massachusetts Passed a Landmark Renewable Energy
Bill—Here’s What You Need to Know, New Eng. Climate Change Rev. Blog (Dec. 19, 2016)
(quoting Robert Fitzpatrick, director of government affairs for the Massachusetts Clean
Energy Center), http://www.northeastern.edu/climatereview/?p=294 [http://perma.cc/
C4E3-4VKK]; see also Press Release, Governor Charlie Baker, Governor Baker Signs
Comprehensive Energy Diversity Legislation (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.mass.gov/governor/
press-office/press-releases/fy2017/governor-baker-signs-comprehensive-energy-diversity-
law.html [http://perma.cc/5D3C-H2P3] (discussing a commitment to “providing resi-
dents and businesses with a . . . reliable clean energy future”).
154. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) at 3–5, Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272
F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 16-CV-8164 (VEC)), 2016 WL 10076867.
155. Id.
156. The ZEC expires, at least under current plans, in 2029. Clean Energy Standard
Order, supra note 99, at 156.
157. Whereas nuclear energy receives $17.50 per megawatt hour under the ZEC plan,
renewables in 2017 were compensated at the rate of around $21 per megawatt hour.
Compare id. at 20, with 2018 Compliance Year, N.Y. State Energy Res. & Dev. Auth.
(NYSERDA), http://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/Clean-Energy-Standard/
REC-and-ZEC-Purchasers/2018-Compliance-Year [http://perma.cc/4C2G-NQPN] (last visited
Mar. 21, 2018). The price awarded to renewables has fallen to $17 per megawatt hour for
2018, supra 2018 Compliance Year, but is likely to rebound in the coming years, as New York
rapidly increases the stringency of its utilities’ renewable purchasing obligations. See REC
and ZEC Purchasers, N.Y. State Energy Res. & Dev. Auth., http://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-
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more explicitly far-reaching in the aims of its ZEC program: The title of
its governing legislation is the “Future Energy Jobs Bill,” and leaders in
the state have touted the ZEC program for its job-preserving potential.158
Each of these policies reflects decisions by state actors—either the
legislature or the commission in charge of electricity—to pursue courses
of decarbonization that focus on goals beyond the most efficient removal
of carbon.159 They want their decarbonization policies to also create new
local industries and jobs, provide new ways for consumers to produce
energy close to home, solve contemporaneous environmental challenges,
preserve open space and utilize abandoned lots or existing structures,
and stabilize energy prices and air emissions during a period of dramatic
transition.
C. Is It All Just Rent Seeking?
It is not difficult to conjure up a public-choice-minded skeptic’s swift
reaction to my argument: social project? These state policies are all just
examples of successful rent seeking, in which certain powerful industries
are benefitting to the detriment of the people of the state!160 A proponent
Programs/Programs/Clean-Energy-Standard/REC-and-ZEC-Purchasers [http://perma.cc/
DXT9-2QYJ] (last visited Mar. 21, 2018) (detailing New York’s increasing “Tier 1 REC”
purchase requirements from 2018 through 2021).
158. See Governor Bruce Rauner Signed the Future Energy Jobs Bill, Bruce Rauner,
http://www.brucerauner.com/news/governor-bruce-rauner-signed-the-future-energy-jobs-
bill/ [http://perma.cc/MZH4-4FYR] (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (observing that the bill
saves “thousands of good-paying jobs”).
159. New York made this point most poignantly in its filings for the FERC conference
on integrating markets and public policy: “Incorporating a single policy goal into the fed-
eral wholesale markets may seemingly help reach that one goal, but may frustrate the mul-
tilayered approach carefully designed by the State and reflects a misunderstanding and
oversimplification of a State’s multi-faceted policy framework.” Scott A. Weiner, N.Y. State
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Pre-Technical Conference Statement at FERC Technical Conference:
State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York
Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 4 (2017)
[hereinafter Weiner, FERC Technical Conference], http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20170426150501-Weiner,%20NY%20State%20DPS.pdf [http://perma.cc/2TC2-2F6U].
160. “Public choice models . . . treat the legislative process as a microeconomic system
in which ‘actual political choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and groups
to further their own interests; these efforts have been labeled ‘rent-seeking.’” Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 878
(1987) (quoting Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371, 371 (1983)) (describing but not endorsing these
models). For more on public choice theories of legislation and regulation, see Mancur
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 141–48
(1965) (discussing “special interest” theory and business lobbies); Martin Gilens &
Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and
Average Citizens, 12 Persp. Pol. 564, 566 (2014) (“A quite different theoretical tradition
argues that U.S. policy making is dominated by individuals who have substantial economic
resources, i.e., high levels of income or wealth—including, but not limited to, ownership
of business firms.”); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 243 (1987) (“A central problem
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of the rent-seeking hypothesis might suggest that most of the state pol-
icies detailed in this Article are deviations from the most efficient way to
decarbonize, which would be to simply put a price on carbon.161 These
deviations might be the result of successful lobbying on the part of
particular clean-energy industries—including nuclear, wind, and solar—
which have secured for themselves premium prices for their particular
type of clean energy at the expense of ratepayers, who are largely unor-
ganized, politically powerless players in these debates.
It is certainly important not to be naïve about the motivations behind
state climate policies. To respond to these concerns, this section makes
two brief points. First, this Article’s argument does not turn on a rejec-
tion of public choice theory or on proof that harmful rent seeking is
absent from state climate policy. Public debate and public churn about
the aims and methods of decarbonization are valuable even if they some-
times result in certain industries getting a boost. Unjustified rent seeking
can be (and is being162) contested through the courts and in the theater
of public debate. In contrast, utilizing RTO governance structures and
energy markets as the locus for debating, hashing out, and implementing
decarbonization policy shunts these debates to much more private,
inaccessible quarters—without eliminating the distinct possibility of rent
seeking also occurring in those forums.163
Second, it is not clear that state decarbonization policy preferences
can easily be shrugged aside as examples of problematic rent seeking. To
be sure, some of these state policies appear to favor certain industries.
But in the case of the most dominant state policy, RPS, it is more fledg-
ling solar and wind developers who stand to benefit most—at the
expense of established fossil fuel companies. That’s hardly a predictable
outcome under a public choice explanation of the companies most likely
to hold sway with government. The same holds true for numerous other
state policies that work against incumbent utility interests.164 The case of
of representative democracy is how to ensure that policy decisions are responsive to the
interests or preferences of citizens.”); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 335, 341–42 (1974) (discussing some versions of
the “capture theory”); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J.
Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3, 3 (1971) (discussing the power of industries to influence and shape
regulation for their own benefit).
161. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
162. See infra section III.C (discussing lawsuits against state policies).
163. On RTO governance processes, see infra section III.B.
164. See Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network
Architecture, Information Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 833, 869–79 (2010) (explaining utilities’ mixed motivations when it comes to
introducing smart grid technologies); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You,
Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1527,
1531–34 (2012) (explaining why utilities are so opposed to reducing demand); see also
Peter Kind, Energy Infrastructure Advocates, Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications
and Strategic Responses to a Changing Retail Electric Business 17 (2013), http://
www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/disruptivechallenges-1.pdf [http://
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ZEC programs for nuclear may seem to better conform to a classic public
choice account of a large corporation persuading lawmakers to give it
special treatment. Even there, though, the supporters of the policy defy
simplistic explanation—the ZEC program divided the environmental
community, with many groups coming out in support of it.165 This divi-
sion suggests that many saw ZECs as productively serving decarbonization
goals.
Moreover, even accepting that some rent seeking may be at work in
these policies, it might not be bad rent seeking.166 Scholars have posited
several ways in which policy mechanisms that favor certain groups may
produce more efficacious or efficient outcomes than neutral policies.
Professor Eric Biber has made the case that when it comes to climate
change, state policies that build interest-group support may create “polit-
ical momentum” that prevents backsliding and allows for a gradual ratch-
eting up of the ambition of climate policies.167 Similarly, Professor Zach
Liscow and Quentin Karpilow argue that when government’s goal is to
encourage innovation—as it is in the realm of decarbonization—state
policies that “specifically encourage cleantech” may be more efficient than
technology-neutral policies like a carbon tax.168 As a separate justification,
perma.cc/6ADJ-TKZJ] (setting forth utility concerns with the popular policy of “net
metering” to promote rooftop solar).
165. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 99, at 53 (noting “comments among
environmental groups are divided”).
166. Many scholars have remarked on the indeterminacy of the concept of “rent seek-
ing”—one person’s “rent” is another person’s social-welfare gain. Mark Kelman, On
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the
Public Choice Movement, 74 Va. L. Rev. 199, 227 (1988) (“When public choice theorists
observe that the political process is an arena of ‘rent-seeking,’ they are being so conceptu-
ally ambiguous in their condemnation that they have simply muddied our discourse.”);
Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 119
(2016) (describing the difficulty of constructing a persuasive “normative account of how
much political power various groups should rightly possess [and] setting a baseline from
which to measure disproportionate influence”); see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 160,
at 896 (“[A] finding of differential impact often can be effectively challenged. Researchers
disagree, for example, over whether trucking regulation benefited owners, drivers, or
both.”).
167. Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Climate Change
Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 399, 402 (2013); see
also Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 Science 1170, 1170
(2015) (“Green industrial policy creates and enhances low-carbon industries, which brings
economic constituencies into coalitions for decarbonization, as well as giving feedback
that drives progress toward more comprehensive climate policy.”); Matthew Wansley,
Virtuous Capture, 67 Admin. L. Rev. 419, 422–23 (2015) (arguing that “rent-seeking is not
socially wasteful” when it allows “political actors . . . [to] use interest groups—by altering
their power and incentives—to pursue public-interested regulatory goals”).
168. Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law,
95 Wash. U. L. Rev. 387, 403, 444 (2017) (asserting that “innovation spillovers,” in which
cleantech innovation builds on itself, “alone might justify government use of deployment
subsidies” which “can help direct innovation flows . . . away from dirtytech and towards
cleantech”).
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Professors William Boyd and Ann Carlson have made a federalism-based,
“laboratories of democracy”–type argument for why we should want
states to experiment with different ways to decarbonize.169
These scholars advance pragmatic arguments as to why state policies
that favor certain pathways to decarbonization might make political or
economic sense.170 This Article’s argument is broader: Any apparent rent
seeking in these policies may be justified as a way to fulfill values related
to decarbonization that go beyond efficiency.171 When states establish
climate change policies, they are—at least in part—channeling value
judgments about how decarbonization should proceed.172
Emerging research suggests that the public has distinct preferences
and value judgments related to decarbonization. In response to surveys
and deliberative polls, individuals have expressed several values beyond
pure economic efficiency they consider important in energy systems
change, including “not wasting;” environmental protection; stability, reli-
ability, and affordability; autonomy and freedom; and social justice and
fairness.173 These diverse values lead people to have strong preferences for
certain technologies over others;174 a concern for low-income protections
169. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 6, at 817; see also N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n v.
N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 158 FERC ¶ 61,137 (Feb. 3, 2017), 2017 WL 496267, at *12
(Bay, Comm’r, concurring) (celebrating state laboratories for their ability to “incentivize
the development of needed energy infrastructure, the deployment of innovative
technologies, or the establishment of Renewable Portfolio Standards”).
170. Professor Rossi has recently advanced the argument that state decarbonization
policies “can better promote efficiency and social welfare by aligning the features of inter-
nal customer subsidies with the same principles that would inform design of a carbon tax.”
Rossi, Carbon Taxation, supra note 8, at 279. This suggestion works if indeed the state
views efficiency as a good measure of social welfare. But if a state determines that other
aims trump efficiency, then it might be perfectly justified in choosing policies that deviate
substantially from a carbon tax.
171. Cf. Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev.
1393, 1396–97 (1981) (explaining how many of our laws appropriately reflect preferences
for ends other than efficiency); Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, supra note 37, at 1024
(suggesting that Americans are interested in fairness and protection from market failure
in addition to efficiency maximization).
172. The democratic link might appear weaker when agencies—rather than legisla-
tures—make decisions about the shape of decarbonization policy. There is, however, a
literature suggesting that agencies might be better positioned in some ways to adopt dem-
ocratically determined preferences. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance:
Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law 37 (1999); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justification for the Administrative State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1515 (1992);
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 Geo.
L.J. 97, 101–02 (2000).
173. Butler et al., Public Values, supra note 147, at 667.
174. Professor Dirk Scheer and his coauthors find a strong preference for renewable
energy over fossil fuel generation combined with “carbon capture and storage.” Dirk
Scheer et al., Public Evaluation of Electricity Technologies and Future Low-Carbon
Portfolios in Germany and the USA, 3 Energy, Sustainability & Soc’y, no. 8, 2013, at 1; see
also Butler et al., Public Values, supra note 147, at 670 (describing “public visions” as “con-
verg[ing] with policy on some of the key areas, specifically reductions in fossil fuels,
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and bill stability over “affordability” as a general metric;175 skepticism
about market mechanisms over regulatory approaches;176 and a desire to
“be heard” on energy system preferences.177
Many of these same preferences emerge in state decarbonization
policies—for example, in concerns over who is benefited and who is bur-
dened by particular policies, in the widespread tendency to favor the pro-
motion of renewable energy above nuclear energy, and in many states’
particular emphasis on individuals’ ability to choose their own energy
supply. State policies on decarbonization, then, can be seen as attempts
to capture the “messy, pluralistic, and pragmatic” goals associated with
the social project of decarbonization and to give voice to community
judgments regarding the desired shape of our future decarbonized soci-
ety.178 Responding to and incorporating these preferences helps a state
maintain broad citizen support for its decarbonization initiatives. With-
out this support, passing the laws necessary to reach “deep decarboniza-
tion” levels of carbon mitigation will be all the more difficult.
Of course, there is no guarantee that state policies are accurately
channeling residents’ preferences in these regards.179 Indeed, I have
argued elsewhere that energy law should pay more attention to how
citizen preferences are generated, understood, and incorporated into
decisionmaking around decarbonization.180 Nevertheless, one need not
increases in RETS . . . , and the need for reductions in demand”); Demski et al., supra note
147, at 59–60, 66 (finding a strong public preference, through deliberative workshops,
among U.K. residents for “micro-generation technologies”); Nick Pidgeon & Christina C.
Demski, From Nuclear to Renewable: Energy System Transformation and Public Attitudes,
68 Bull. Atomic Sci. 41, 42 (2012) (describing preference for nuclear over wind in one
Welsh county).
175. See Butler et al., Public Values, supra note 147, at 669 (finding that the group
studied was more concerned with “subsidies for low income households and developments
to ensure cost stability over and above lowest cost possible”).
176. Id. at 670.
177. Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 581, 585–87
(2018) [hereinafter Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy] (documenting the growing
demands of citizen groups focused on “energy democracy” to be included in the creation
of energy regulation); see also Leslie Mabon et al., Deliberative Decarbonisation?
Assessing the Potential of an Ethical Governance Framework for Low-Carbon Energy
Through the Case of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, 33 Envt. & Plan. C: Gov’t &
Pol’y 256, 258–59 (2015) (suggesting that current governance processes for decarboniza-
tion suffer from “epistemic injustice” in the ways that “particular technologies come to be
conceived as solutions to the problems of climate change”).
178. See Kysar, supra note 38, at 3, 15–16 (making the argument that these charac-
teristics have always described the diverse goals of environmental policymaking).
179. Cf. Gilens & Page, supra note 160, at 565 (finding that “mass-based interest
groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence” on U.S. government
policy, but also observing that these policies track their preferences “roughly two-thirds of
the time”).
180. See Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, supra note 177, at 586 (identifying
three emerging conceptions of what “energy democracy” might entail, including consumer
choice, local control, and access to process).
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have perfect faith in state democracies181 in order to accept the central
argument of this Article, which is one of comparative institutional compe-
tence.182 The choices currently on the table for states pursuing decarbon-
ization are either (1) maintain robust state public policies as a way to
establish the contours of decarbonizing electricity or (2) transfer central
responsibility for ensuring decarbonization to regional electricity mar-
kets. The next Part describes why regional electricity markets are a
troublesome mechanism for accomplishing the social project of
decarbonization.
III. ELECTRICITY-MARKET REDESIGN TO ACCOMPLISH
THE PROJECT OF DECARBONIZATION
Almost every academic (myself included) prefers that policies to
address climate change include some sort of national carbon tax or cap-
and-trade scheme.183 Putting a price on carbon is theoretically appealing
because of its potential breadth, simplicity, and efficiency.184 Most states
181. Nor should one: Several recent articles do excellent work in reminding us why we
should not “put state democracy on a pedestal.” See David Schleicher, Federalism and
State Democracy, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 763, 767–68 (2017) (arguing state and local elections
often “have little to do with anything that ought to matter––like the past performance of
state government, or candidates’ positions on issues in front of the state or local govern-
ments”); Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93
N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing the role of civil society oversight at the state level and finding that
“state agencies are, on the whole, less transparent than their federal counterparts, less
closely followed by watchdog groups, and less tracked by the shrinking state-level media”);
see also Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to
Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
1768, 1782 (2002) (book review) (arguing that state regulatory processes are more amena-
ble to capture than federal regulatory processes).
182. Cf. Komesar, supra note 21, at 3–4 (arguing that “institutional choice is an essen-
tial part of law and public policy choice” and advocating for a “participation-centered”
framework for “doing comparative institutional analysis”).
183. There is, however, debate regarding whether carbon pricing should be supple-
mented with additional policies. See Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy:
Cap-and-Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 Harv. J. on Legis. 207, 207 (2012) (explor-
ing issues of complementarity and competition between economy-wide carbon policies
and more targeted strategies). My argument here regarding the “social nature” of the
project of decarbonization leads me to conclude that supplementary policies are desirable
to the extent that a polity wants to control the shape of decarbonization.
184. See Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 168, at 457–63 (collecting sources in favor of
carbon pricing); see also Peter Howard & Derek Sylvan, Inst. for Policy Integrity, Expert
Consensus on the Economics of Climate Change 2 (2015), http://policyintegrity.org/
files/publications/ExpertConsensusReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/DE98-N2RW] (report-
ing survey results showing that 75% of expert economists favor a market-based mechanism
for carbon); Jerry Taylor, Niskanen Ctr., The Conservative Case for a Carbon Tax 3–10
(2015), http://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/The-Conservative-Case-
for-a-Carbon-Tax1.pdf [http://perma.cc/K8LE-Z9Q8] (arguing that the alternative to a
carbon tax “is a plethora of command-and-control regulatory interventions,” which
already “impose a sort of carbon tax”).
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with robust decarbonization policies also support some sort of national
carbon-pricing scheme, particularly one that would allow them to pursue
additional side policies to address their citizens’ decarbonization prefer-
ences.185 Despite its theoretical appeal, however, such a scheme is a politi-
cal pipe dream in the near term.186
In its place, proponents have advanced the idea of addressing decar-
bonization within regional electricity markets as a compromise measure.
Although covering less of the country and less of the economy than a
federal carbon price, including decarbonization aims in electricity
markets still holds some advantages over state-by-state efforts. The many
parties in favor of using markets to achieve decarbonization goals argue
that market incorporation represents the most feasible way, in the cur-
rent political climate, to efficiently decarbonize.187 At the same time, they
suggest, incorporating state climate goals into markets would help con-
trol the purported damage that variegated state climate policies do to
regional electricity markets.188
This Part first describes leading proposals for how to achieve state
climate goals through RTO markets and the governance processes these
proposals would have to go through. It then advances three reasons why
the compromise measure of achieving decarbonization through electric-
ity markets is a risky substitute for robust, democratically determined
action on climate change. In brief, these reasons are that (1) procedur-
ally, given RTO governance structures, using these market constructs to
achieve climate goals would remove decisions over decarbonization fur-
ther from the public view and democratic oversight; (2) substantively,
incorporating climate goals into regional electricity markets would
homogenize and water down state preferences; and (3) recent Supreme
Court precedent creates a risk that once states cede control over decarboni-
zation to an RTO, they may give away some ability to adopt supplementary
policies to strengthen or shape the trajectory of their decarbonization
efforts.
185. Most states do not, however, favor allowing federal policy to preempt supplemen-
tary state policies. See Memorandum from Mary D. Nichols, Cal. Air Res. Bd. et al., to
Senators Kerry, Graham, & Lieberman (Mar. 30, 2010) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing that federal climate legislation should “establish a national carbon mar-
ket and include national programs, while preserving states’ rights to implement their own
climate policies”).
186. See, e.g., Timothy Cama, Trump Brings Big Changes to Climate Policies, The Hill
(Feb. 10, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/318824-trump-brings-
big-change-to-climate-policies [http://perma.cc/SV8N-JM7F] (discussing the Trump
Administration and Republican Congress’s climate policies, which largely favor limiting
regulations and enacting measures to “unwind Obama-era rules on energy”).
187. See infra notes 197–199.
188. See supra section I.C.
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A. Proposed Market Reforms to Achieve State Policies
Stakeholders have proposed two predominant reforms to incorpo-
rate state climate aims into regional electricity markets. The first is for
electricity markets to create their own carbon-pricing systems, analogous
to a carbon tax. Thus, for example, certain stakeholders in New
England’s RTO have proposed the following scheme:
Under a carbon pricing system, each electricity producer
would pay an emissions fee in direct proportion to the amount
of carbon (in tons) its generation facilities emit. The carbon
emissions price (that is, the fee per ton emitted) could be fixed,
be a set price schedule that increases over time, or be
dynamically adjusted based on aggregate performance over
time to satisfy specific carbon reduction objectives.189
PJM—the mid-Atlantic RTO—has proposed a similar scheme, sug-
gesting a carbon-pricing system might also be pursued by a subset of the
region interested in a carbon price, should the entire region prove
unable to reach agreement.190 And New York’s RTO has also come out in
favor of a carbon-pricing scheme in that single-state market.191 New
York’s proposal focuses on using the (now-defunct, federal192) “social cost
of carbon” to create a “carbon adder” for each generator based on its
carbon emissions.193 “This fee would be added to the prices generators
bid into the wholesale electricity market and those adjusted prices used
by NYISO to determine the dispatch order.”194
189. ISO New England, NEPOOL 2016 IMAPP Proposals: Observations, Issues, and
Next Steps 2 (2017) [hereinafter ISO-NE Proposal], http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/
documents/2017/03/iso-ne_jan_2017_imapp_memo_vtransmit2.pdf [http://perma.cc/
2354-QND3]. The ways in which this scheme would interact with the current carbon-
pricing regime in the New England region are discussed in section IV.B.
190. PJM, Advancing Zero Emissions Objectives Through PJM’s Energy Markets: A




191. See Bradley C. Jones, President & CEO, N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc. (NYISO),
Pre-Technical Conference Comments at the FERC Technical Conference: State Policies
and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York Independent
System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 4 (2017), http://www.ferc.gov/
CalendarFiles/20170426150524-Jones,%20NYISO.pdf [http://perma.cc/C3W3-BV88].
192. See supra note 101.
193. Justin Gundlach & Romany Webb, Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change Law, Columbia
Law Sch., Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets: Federal and State Issues 31 (2017),
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/02/Gundlach-Webb-2017-02-Carbon-Pricing-
in-NYISO-Markets.pdf [http://perma.cc/P79H-2NQB].
194. Id. at iii–iv; see also Samuel A. Newell et al., The Brattle Grp., Pricing Carbon into
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A separate set of proposals focuses on using RTOs to run central-
ized, market-based procurement processes specifically for clean energy.
Thus, for example, an RTO might create a “Forward Clean Energy
Market,” in which the market operator would solicit contracts for future
commitments of low- or no-carbon resources in an annual auction.195
This model would, in essence, amalgamate the various state RPSs in a
region and attempt to satisfy them all at the same time and at the lowest
cost. Such a scheme would also guarantee renewables a certain amount
of revenue into the future, helping to create the certainty necessary to
obtain project financing.196
Proponents of these reforms include many clean-energy as well as
fossil-fuel generators, 197 well-regarded market analysts, 198 and several
states and environmental groups.199 There is an obvious reason for this
195. See ISO-NE Proposal, supra note 189, at 4–5.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Aleksandar Mitreski, Senior Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Brookfield
Renewable, Panel 2: Stakeholder’s Perspective in ISO-NE (Apr. 26, 2017), http://
www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170426150309-Mitreski,%20Brookfield%20Renewable.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TS2G-98KR]; John E. Shelk, President & CEO, Elec. Power Supply
Ass’n, Opening Statement at FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale
Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator,
Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 2 (May 1, 2017) [hereinafter EPSA, FERC Technical
Conference], http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170426150649-Shelk,%20EPSA.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8C3L-BFTK] (“States have an important role to play given that the FPA
reserves retail jurisdiction to States . . . . However, it is critical that federal and state authori-
ties be exercised within the law and in concert to achieve federal and state policy objec-
tives consistent with well-functioning wholesale power markets.”); NRG Energy, FERC
Technical Conference, supra note 120, at 1–2 (“The uniform American experience is that
competition drives down prices, increases quality of service, and encourages technical
innovation.”).
198. See, e.g., Samuel A. Newell, Principal, Brattle Grp., Comments at FERC Technical
Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc.,
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 2 (Apr. 25,
2017) [hereinafter Brattle Group, FERC Technical Conference], http://www.ferc.gov/
CalendarFiles/20170426151703-Newell,%20The%20Brattle%20Group.pdf [http://perma.cc/
X6VM-3XCT] (“Harnessing competition will be critical for spurring innovation and
guiding technology choices to help meet environmental and reliability objectives cost
effectively. The centralized wholesale markets can best orchestrate this kind of
competition if they are enhanced to incorporate the states’ decarbonization objectives.”).
199. See Erwin, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 113, at 5 (“FERC should
investigate placing value on the avoided externalized costs of non-emitting generation
resources.”); Andrew G. Place, Vice Chairman, Penn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Pre-Technical
Conference Statement at FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets
Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., at 3–4 (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20170426150811-Place,%20Pennsylvania%20PUC.pdf [http://perma.cc/B6LM-WC45] (laud-
ing the potential efficiencies of these solutions); Angela M. O’Connor, Chairman, Mass.
Dep’t of Pub. Util., Pre-Technical Conference Statement at FERC Technical Conference:
State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York
Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 4 (Apr. 2017),
http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170426150007-O’Connor,%20Massachuetts%20DPU.pdf
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broad-based support: Pricing carbon into electricity markets should help
to achieve electricity-sector carbon-emissions reductions more efficiently,
since a market price drives innovation and doesn’t predetermine win-
ners.200 Similarly, having a market scheme procure all of a region’s renew-
able-energy demand would be a more efficient way to meet state RPSs
than having each state’s utilities go it alone.201 As a substantive matter,
then, the argument for subsuming state climate policies into markets is
relatively straightforward: It offers a more efficient way to accomplish
state public policy aims while keeping electricity prices as “just and
reasonable” as possible. Relatedly, it avoids the need to constantly guard
[http://perma.cc/JR4B-4FTR] (“Massachusetts . . . remains firmly committed to finding
market-based solutions that can not only accommodate our currently effective statutory
requirements in the short-term, but that can also provide market-based frameworks for
accomplishing the Commonwealth’s goals through the competitive markets on a long-term
basis.”). But not all states and environmental groups are on board—many have come out at
least against certain types of market integration. See, e.g., Memorandum from New England
States Comm. on Elec. to New England Power Pool, supra note 16, at 1 (“NESCOE confirms
that it does not support an additional carbon pricing-style mechanism in furtherance of state
laws . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Brien J. Sheahan, Chairman, Ill. Commerce Comm’n, Pre-
Technical Conference Statement at FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale
Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 3 (2017), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20170426150841-Sheahan,%20Illinois%20Commerce%20Commission.pdf [http://perma.cc/
XFV8-BAUF] (“Illinois supports regional market design modifications that either complement
or enhance state policy initiatives.”); Robert B. Stoddard, Conservation Law Found., Prefiled
Comments at FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by
ISO-New England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., at 3 (Apr. 2017), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20170426151751-Stoddard,%20Conservation%20Law%20Foundation.pdf [http://perma.cc/
HJ8Z-2T4H] [hereinafter Conservation Law Found., FERC Technical Conference] (supporting
a “carbon adder” but explaining that its “practical drawbacks” led the organization to “develop
a supplementary financial instrument to address these deficiencies”). Note that NESCOE does
support further exploration of a Forward Clean Energy Market. Memorandum from New
England States Comm. on Elec. To New England Power Pool, supra, at 4.
200. See Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 168, at 389–97 (collecting sources making this
argument); Jonas J. Monast et al., On Morals, Markets, and Climate Change: Exploring
Pope Francis’ Challenge, 80 Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 1, 2017, at 139 (“Incorporating
externalities into the cost of production has the virtue of ‘getting the price right’ and
moves the market toward the economically efficient outcome from a utilitarian social wel-
fare maximization perspective, in which the price paid for a good reflects the full marginal
cost of its production.”); Brattle Group, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 198, at 3
(“The most market-oriented approach to implementing a decarbonization policy is to
price carbon emissions.”).
201. See Brattle Group, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 198, at 4 (“[C]lean
energy markets would maximize competition and innovation by admitting new and exist-
ing resources of all clean technologies (although they still would not provide as broad a
price signal as carbon prices).”); see also ISO-NE Proposal, supra note 189, at 4.
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against potential market distortions caused by state public policies, thus
maintaining predictable, well-functioning competitive markets.202
Despite widespread support, these proposals are not without
challenges. One of these is legal—it is not clear that federally overseen
electricity markets have the mandate to include environmental considera-
tions within their dispatch models. As noted in the introduction, many
excellent legal minds are engaged in this analysis.203 A second challenge
is less strictly legal in nature, although it implicates jurisdictional fric-
tions. It is relatively clear what states might gain from integrating climate
policies into regional electricity markets. But no action is without
tradeoffs. What, then, do they stand to lose? The remainder of this Part
tackles this question.
B. How a Stakeholder Proposal Becomes a Tariff Provision: The Intricacies of
RTO Governance
To enact a regional decarbonization mechanism, a proposal would
first have to clear complex RTO and FERC governance processes. RTOs
are “Frankenstein like”204 hybridized creatures, singular in their structure.205
These organizations operate as not-for-profit corporations, governed by a
board of directors and overseen by FERC.206 Functionally, RTOs manage
the day-to-day transfer of electricity across utility transmission lines, as
202. See, e.g., EPSA, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 197, at 2 (arguing that
FERC should incorporate decarbonization policies into markets as the strategy most “con-
sistent with investing private at-risk capital based on market price signals”).
203. See supra note 35.
204. John P. Hughes, President & CEO, Elec. Consumers Res. Council (ELCON),
Statement at FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated
by ISO-New England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., at 325 (May 2, 2017), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20170530122053-Transcript,%20May%202,%202017.pdf [http://perma.cc/R7MN-B7EZ].
205. Christina Simeone, Kleinman Ctr. for Energy Pol’y, PJM Governance: Can
Reforms Improve Outcomes? 22 (2017) (“As organizations, RTO’s are unique in structure,
authority, and function.”). To be sure, one might include RTOs in the larger category of
“quasi-governmental institutions,” but to group them there does little to illuminate their
particular pathologies, which are of interest here. Cf. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 12,
at 7 (describing the “inadequate jurisdictional authority, related concerns of overlapping
or fragmented authority, and heavy involvement of private actors in energy governance” of
RTOs).
206. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., By-Laws § 2.1 (effective Dec. 1, 2009), http://
www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/corp-docs/by-laws.ashx [http://perma.cc/R8LZ-DQZC]
(establishing a PJM Board elected by PJM members to “manage the business and affairs of
the Company”); see also California ISO (CAISO), Docket No. 16-RGO-01, Principles for
Governance of a Regional ISO 9 (Oct. 7, 2016) (“PJM, MISO, and ISO-NE all have boards
with nine voting members, while SPP has seven voting members.”). Selection processes for
the membership of RTO boards have been a matter of some controversy, but such con-
troversy exceeds the scope of this Article. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at
563–67 (reviewing issues that arise in selecting and terminating RTO boards).
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well as coordinate electricity markets.207 They exist only in those areas in
which utilities have voluntarily ceded operational control of their
transmission assets after obtaining the approval of their home states to
do so.208 Tariffs, by-laws, and operating agreements dictate the terms of
RTO operations and governance, and the RTO board must file proposed
changes in these documents with FERC for its approval.209 In deter-
mining whether to approve an RTO’s proposed changes, FERC evaluates
whether they will further “just and reasonable” rates and avoid “unduly
discriminatory or preferential” practices, after hearing from interested
parties through a notice-and-comment procedure.210
Before a board can make such a request to FERC, any proposal must
go through internal RTO-governance processes.211 RTO boards solicit the
opinions and expertise of stakeholders principally through topic-specific
committees. 212 These committees ostensibly allow all stakeholders—
persons with an interest in the market rules—to have their views consid-
ered.213 But only “members” receive voting privileges.214 Members are
207. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 813–15 (Dec. 20,
1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
208. See id. at 831 (describing the voluntary approach to RTO formation); see also
Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 548 (explaining that RTOs are “between
government and business”); Daniel Greenfield & John Kwoka, The Cost Structure of
Regional Transmission Organizations, 32 Energy J. 159, 163 (2011) (“RTOs are unusual
economic institutions. They are not-for-profit corporations that assume control and man-
agement of the bulk power transport systems of their member utilities, while the latter
continue to own all of those assets.”).
209. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c)–(d) (2012); see also N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744
F.3d 74, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that “tariff” is “the term of art used to refer to the
‘classifications, practices, and regulations’ a public utility uses to establish electricity
rates”); Simeone, supra note 205, at 9 (detailing PJM’s governing documents).
210. 16 U.S.C. § 824e; see also Peskoe, supra note 35, at 10 (describing how FERC
evaluates regional proposals).
211. Note that the description that follows of RTO governance is necessarily a broad
sketch, since each region “has its own power and governance structure and each relies on
its own particular language and terminology.” Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at
561. This Article attempts to capture their substantial similarities. See E4The Future, Inc.,
Regional Energy Markets: Do Inconsistent Governance Structures Impede U.S. Market
Success? 3 (2016) (surveying RTO governance and finding “nearly all” of them follow a
process like the one detailed here).
212. See Benjamin A. Stafford & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Winds of Change in Energy
Systems: Policy Implementation, Technology Deployment, and Regional Transmission
Organizations, 21 Energy Res. & Soc. Sci. 222, 230 (2016) (describing MISO’s engagement
with stakeholders).
213. Id. at 224 (“RTO stakeholders represent different interests, including owners of
transmission assets, generation assets, power marketers, and environmental advocates as
well as industrial energy load, energy market traders, state policy makers, and others.”).
214. See E4The Future, Inc., supra note 211, at 3 (surveying RTO operating proce-
dures and finding that “[w]hile many allow the public to participate in RTO/ISO business
activities, most restrict who can fully participate in the stakeholder process by establishing
paid membership requirements and allowing voting by members only”).
2018] ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND DECARBONIZATION 1111
predominantly transmission-owning utilities, generators, and other
energy-market participants with financial stakes in market outcomes.215
Membership rules vary by RTO, but generally becoming a member
requires establishing an interest in the operations of the market and pay-
ing annual membership dues.216 Members are grouped by their interest
in the markets, with weighted votes established by group.217 Typically, a
proposal for reform must obtain a super-majority vote by the members of a
committee before it is recommended for the RTO board’s consideration.218
RTOs also have structures in place for states to provide input into
regional electricity-market governance. Most notably, this influence
occurs via “regional state committees” comprised of state representatives
(typically utility commissioners) from the states within the RTO’s terri-
tory.219 These committees supply feedback to RTO boards of directors on
proposed tariff changes, which the boards take into account in deciding
whether to recommend any changes to FERC. Such committees do not,
however, have any formalized role in the RTO process—a source of con-
sternation for some, given how important RTO governance is for state
policy outcomes.220
215. See Seth Blumsack et al., Can Capacity Markets Be Designed by Democracy?,
Proc. of the 50th Haw. Int’l Conf. on Sys. Sci. 3075, 3076 (2017) (breaking down PJM’s
voting members into categories); About 60% of the U.S. Electric Power Supply Is Managed
by RTOs, U.S. Energy Info. Admin.: Today in Energy (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=790 [http://perma.cc/3WEG-MNS4] (explaining the types
of members that RTOs have).
216. See, e.g., 4 Southwest Power Pool, Inc., Bylaws § 2.1 (effective Nov. 10, 2014), http://
www.spp.org/documents/13272/current%20bylaws%20and%20membership%20agreement
%20tariff.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9U5-XP4C] (“Qualifications: Membership in SPP is
voluntary and is open to any . . . entity willing to meet the membership requirements,
including execution of the Membership Agreement.”). Some regions will waive dues for
good cause. See, e.g., id. § 8.2 (effective Aug. 5, 2018).
217. See Dylan Reed & Arvin Ganesan, How Grid Governance Stands in the Way of
Advanced Energy Progress, Advanced Energy Econ.: Advanced Energy Perspectives (Sept.
8, 2016), http://blog.aee.net/how-grid-governance-stands-in-the-way-of-advanced-energy-
progress [http://perma.cc/RN5F-NGUG].
218. E4The Future, Inc., supra note 211, at 11 (“The voting thresholds in each stake-
holder process require super-majorities in almost every situation.”). PJM, for example,
requires that pending motions be approved “by a 75 percent sector-weighted vote of the
members present at the committee meeting, where each sector gets a 20 percent share of
the vote.” Id. at 6.
219. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 588–91 (describing these entities).
For examples of regional state committees, see, e.g., Southwest Power Pool, Inc., supra
note 216, § 7.2; Independent State Agencies Committee, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/
committees-and-groups/isac.aspx [http://perma.cc/3J9K-S2PT] (last visited Jan. 19, 2018);
New England States Committee on Electricity, http://nescoe.com [http://perma.cc/NSU6-
B9N9] (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
220. See Simeone, supra note 205, at 41 (recommending a more formal role for states
in RTO governance); Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 588–91 (describing states’
lack of formal influence at RTOs).
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Despite these channels of input and influence, RTO boards remain
“independent.”221 Thus, a board need not formally follow either members’
majority preferences or state wishes. When it submits its final decisions to
FERC, however, an RTO board frequently explains major deviations from
members’ recommendations.222 In practice, then, it is substantially easier
for a board to establish that a proposed change is “just and reasonable” if
a substantial proportion of its members—and its members’ states—so
agree.223 Members, states, or other stakeholders that continue to disagree
with an RTO proposal can protest the changes during FERC’s vetting
process or ultimately through a lawsuit.224 These protests can also be
backed up by the more drastic measure of deciding to leave the RTO (in
the case of member utilities)225 or requiring their utilities to leave the
RTO (in the case of states).
Any decision by an RTO to incorporate decarbonization objectives
into market operations would occur through the process outlined above:
An RTO board would determine—by a requisite margin of votes—that
such changes would help to ensure “just and reasonable rates” and
would file a petition with FERC to have such changes approved. FERC
would then have the ultimate decision on whether including decar-
bonization in RTO market rules would in fact be “just and reasonable.”226
The remainder of this Part discusses the pathologies that might emerge
from using this decisionmaking structure to achieve decarbonization
aims.
C. Resulting Challenges for RTO Control of Decarbonization
Several characteristics of RTOs make them imperfect sites for deci-
sions on the shape of decarbonization policies. This section details three
particular flaws that should give states pause in ceding control over
decarbonization policy to their RTOs: (1) RTO governance presents a
diminished space for deliberative, democratic decisionmaking, as com-
pared to state politics; (2) RTO-governance structures create a tendency
221. See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed.
Reg. 64,099, 64,157 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing the challenge
of “balanc[ing] customers’ and other stakeholders’ need for effective access to the boards
of RTOs and ISOs, with the need for the independent management of each RTO and
ISO”); Stafford & Wilson, supra note 212, at 231 (“All stakeholder voting in MISO is con-
sidered ‘advisory’ in nature and MISO is not required [sic] follow stakeholder votes.”).
222. See, e.g., E4The Future, Inc., supra note 211, at 4 (noting that when the New
England RTO provides a proposal to FERC without unanimous stakeholder support, it
must “explain in its filing why its proposal is superior”).
223. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing the standard by which
FERC evaluates an RTO’s proposed changes).
224. See 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (2012).
225. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 570 (arguing that members’ ability
to “vote with [their] feet” threatens RTO independence, as RTOs “desire to retain partici-
pants and geographic spread”).
226. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d.
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for policies to become homogenized and watered down when adopted at
the regional level; and (3) the jurisdictional frictions created by Hughes
pose a risk that states may diminish their own tools for controlling decar-
bonization if they cede the same functions to their RTOs.
1. A Loss of Public Procedure. — The first challenge of RTO control
over decarbonization policies has to do with RTOs’ governance structure,
and in particular, the relative sway of various stakeholders and members
within RTO governance. Many suspect that stakeholders with assets man-
aged by the RTO—that is, transmission owners—have outsized influence,
given that they can wield the threat of leaving the RTO should they be
dissatisfied with a change in the governing rules.227 Similarly, although
“membership” is not limited to these asset holders, weighted voting by
membership sector can stack the deck against public interest organiza-
tions or those without a strong foothold in the industry.228
Moreover, even if the stakeholder-committee processes were viewed
as fair, participation in them would still be challenging. In a recent study
that interviewed numerous participants in RTO governance, the tenor of
many responses was along the following lines: To participate successfully,
“you have to be a combination of an economist and a math wizard.”229
Others observed that the sheer quantity of stakeholder meetings at RTOs
makes it impossible for smaller, less resourced organizations to
participate.230
These challenges point to the first key risk of shunting decarboniza-
tion policy into RTOs: They offer considerably less transparent, only
quasi-public frameworks in which to make these critically important deci-
sions. Although RTO-governance processes nominally give boards inde-
pendent decisionmaking power (a structure that itself already lessens
public accountability), their membership rules and the weight that FERC
gives to stakeholder opinions—both as a matter of law and practice—
dampen this independence.231 Thus, if RTOs take over decarbonization
227. See, e.g., American Municipal Power, FERC Technical Conference, supra note
112, at 2 (suggesting the “rules churn” at PJM provides “a cloak for ‘gaming’ behavior”);
see also, e.g., Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 561–62 (noting stakeholder worries
that RTOs are not as independent as they should be); Kavulla, supra note 56 (suggesting
that “usually . . . moneyed ‘stakeholders’ get their way”); Kenneth Rose, Trouble in Market
Paradise: Development of the Regional Transmission Operator, 50 J. Econ. Issues 535, 536
(2016) (noting RTOs’ stakeholders include “market participants” with “strong economic
interest[s] in RTO rules and procedures”).
228. See Blumsack et al., supra note 215, at 3083 (“[T]here may be limits to the
degree to which organizations like RTOs can create mechanisms for heterogeneous stake-
holders with opposing interests to develop passable market rules and protocols.”).
229. Stafford & Wilson, supra note 212, at 230; see also id. (quoting a respondent des-
cribing these processes as “a world of acronyms” in which it is easy to get lost).
230. Id. at 231 (quoting a respondent to highlight the multitude of RTO stakeholder
meetings which often occur at overlapping times).
231. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 562, 570–71 (noting RTOs’ need to
“maintain relationships with . . . stakeholders”).
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policymaking, it will not be elected public officials or their appointed
bureaucrats, but private companies, who will hold much of the power to
determine the shape of these efforts.
Having expressed these concerns about stakeholder governance, it is
important to acknowledge some limits on the extent to which private
companies would shape RTO-led decarbonization efforts, particularly on
the front end. No RTO is likely to proceed with decarbonization efforts
without support from participating states, at least in the current legal and
political climate.232 States hold this sway because of another feature of
RTOs: their explicit disengagement from creating new “policy.”233 RTO
representatives maintain: “We are a taker of policy not a maker of policy.
. . . We don’t create policy. We attempt to interpret policy as handed to
us.”234 Because RTOs eschew any role in determining what the “public
interest” is, states retain what Professor Christina Simeone has described
as “an incredible amount of power and influence” in shaping the interac-
tion of public policies and markets.235
RTOs disclaim this policymaking function for both political and
legal reasons. Politically, it would be substantially harder to convince
states to let their utilities join or remain in RTOs if membership meant
ceding state policymaking authority to this quasi-private entity. As a legal
matter, imagine if an RTO were to include any sort of decarbonization
requirement—such as a carbon price—that caused a state’s utilities to
pay extra for electricity. For states in which state decarbonization policy
supported this change, a “just and reasonable” finding would be under-
standable—as noted above, pricing carbon in the market would likely
help the state accomplish its aims at the lowest price possible. In contrast,
for any state that did not have a policy in place that supported this extra
payment, a carbon price might well be “unjust and unreasonable”
because it would force the residents of the state to pay more for reasons
unsupported by any state or federal policy.236 Accordingly, any state that
232. In contrast, if significant national climate change policy reemerged, one could
imagine an RTO basing its authority to integrate decarbonization goals on this legal
requirement, rather than on state legal requirements.
233. Stafford & Wilson, supra note 212, at 229 (suggesting state-level policy dictates
RTO policy).
234. Id.
235. Simeone, supra note 205, at 27.
236. See Robert R. Scott, Comm’r, N.H. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Pre-Technical Conference
Statement at FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated
by ISO-New England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C., at 2 (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/
20170426150034-Scott,%20%20NHPUC.pdf [http://perma.cc/T5KY-CHX5] (“[S]tates
like New Hampshire that have no legal mandate to reduce carbon emissions beyond RGGI
are insistent that they pay none of the costs of implementing other states’ policies.”); see
also Peskoe, supra note 35, at 34 & n.217 (explaining that to avoid this legal risk, “an RTO
carbon adder should be designed to achieve compliance with public policies and not to
mitigate environmental harms”).
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did not believe its underlying decarbonization policies justified its utili-
ties’ increased costs for wholesale power would have a strong legal claim
to advance in front of FERC and the federal judiciary.
There is, in sum, a byzantine set of dynamics facing RTO efforts to
integrate state decarbonization aims. RTOs would be unlikely to request
such changes in their tariffs unless both stakeholder committees—via
super-majority vote—and all states in a region endorsed the request.
FERC, similarly, would be unlikely to approve the request if any state felt
it unfairly required its customers to pay for more decarbonization than
state law mandated. Not only would all of these negotiations occur
deeper in the shadows than does state climate change policymaking, but
this de facto near-consensus procedural requirement would also likely
have troubling substantive impacts, discussed in the following section.
2. Homogenization and the Watering Down of Preferences. — The second
challenge with using RTOs to achieve state decarbonization aims is that
their structure and legal mandate leaves them with a diminished set of
policy tools as compared to states. Accordingly, the use of these markets
to achieve state goals would likely entail both homogenization and water-
ing down of state preferences.
The more drastic homogenizing force would come from imposition
of a carbon price, which would require substantial regional agreement
across a range of topics. The entire theory behind a carbon-pricing
scheme is that it eliminates aims beyond the cheapest decarbonization
achievable.237 Away would go state preferences for particular types of
clean energy, particular locations or scales, or broad-based inclusion or
redistribution as a part of decarbonization policy (except to the extent
that states continued to pursue these goals through separate, state-specific
side policies).238
Moreover, states would also have to homogenize their timing and
targets for decarbonization. In order for a carbon price to work, there
would likely have to be a single price throughout a region.239 Setting this
price would be challenging, given the divergent state decarbonization
targets that exist in multistate regions.240 To reach region-wide agreement
237. Peskoe, supra note 35, at 34 (suggesting the “social cost of carbon” is not cur-
rently reflected in FERC rates).
238. See Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, supra note 37, at 988–92, 1001 (describing
how energy markets reduce all decisionmaking to economic optimality, ignoring questions
of redistribution or values other than efficiency). Whether states could pursue their
desired suite of side policies would depend on how circuit courts interpret and apply
Hughes–—a topic taken up infra section IV.B.
239. See PJM, Advancing Zero Emissions Objectives, supra note 190, at 1 (“To avoid
significant complexity . . . a single carbon price is required across the carbon price sub-
region.”). Brattle Group suggests a multistate region could possibly administer multiple
carbon prices, although it admits that such an idea is “complicated” and “needs to be
developed further.” See Brattle Group, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 198, at 4.
240. See Conservation Law Found., FERC Technical Conference, supra note 199, at 1–
2 (discussing the complexity of “integrating state policy preferences into RTO Markets”);
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on a price, states with higher targets would either have to accept a price
that would not fully satisfy their decarbonization goals, or find a way to
refund revenues from the regional carbon-pricing scheme to those
neighbor-states that otherwise feel that they would be “overpaying” (a
politically contentious work-around, to be sure).241 This dynamic would
create a pull toward a “lowest-common-denominator” level of carbon
pricing—which would be bad both for states keen on rapid decarboniza-
tion and for free-riding states that want to see their neighbors carry more
of the burden of achieving decarbonization.242
A less drastic homogenization of state climate policies might occur
in the case of a Forward Clean Energy Market. In this model, states could
control their overall level of desired renewable procurement and pass
this information on to the market operator.243 But such a scheme would
still require, at a minimum, agreement on qualifying resources. To be
sure, the scheme could be designed to allow states to make requests for
certain types, as well as amounts, of renewable power.244 The more the
market was segmented by resource type, however, the less benefit it
would provide in the form of an interstate, least-cost auction.245 Accord-
ingly, a Forward Clean Energy Market would also create pressure to
homogenize resource preferences in order to reap the benefits of creat-
ing a regional auction.246
The homogenizing forces described here present two distinct lines of
concern. The first springs from theories of democratic experimentalism.247
see also Brian Forshaw, Conn. Mun. Elec. Energy Coop., Written Comments for FERC
Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO-New
England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., at 4 (May 1, 2017) [hereinafter CMEEC, FERC Technical Conference], http://
www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20170426150137-Forshaw,%20Energy%20Market%20Advisors.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RP35-N3Y9].
241. See PJM, Advancing Zero Emissions Objectives, supra note 190, at 1–2 (explain-
ing the need for states to agree on participation and on a price).
242. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 564 (explaining that the structure of
RTO governance means that “[t]he need for consensus may result in the least common
denominator option winning out”).
243. In this way, the Clean Energy Market is not intended “to eliminate or replace
state renewable portfolio standards, but . . . is a complimentary system for market procure-
ment of the RECs needed to meet the RPS.” Renew Northeast & Nextera Energy,
Presentation at NEPOOL IMAPP Meeting: A New IMAPP Proposal 13 (Jan. 25, 2017) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
244. See id. at 6.
245. See id.
246. Professor Felix Mormann confirms this argument by making a similar point with
respect to the idea of pursuing a federal RPS, arguing that “[g]eographic gains from a
federal policy approach would likely come at the expense of a federal RPS’s aspirational
aggressiveness,” because a “federally palatable RPS regime . . . would likely aim lower aspi-
rationally and, ultimately, have a shallower impact.” Mormann, supra note 36, at 1643.
247. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 288 (1998) (arguing for greater use of “demo-
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Because decarbonization is in the early stages of what looks to be a long,
expensive, transformative slog, perhaps it is best at this stage to allow
multiple models to flourish, instead of subsuming state policies into
regional markets. Former FERC Chair Norman Bay adopted this position
in a concurrence authored right before his resignation, in which he
celebrated state decarbonization policies for their experimental
character.248 And Professors Ann Carlson and William Boyd have made a
thoughtful case regarding the national decarbonization benefits that
such state experiments can produce.249
This classic “laboratories of democracy” line of argument is compel-
ling, but it captures only part of the challenge that states face as they con-
sider regionalizing their decarbonization efforts through RTOs. In this
context, the choice is not simply between the state, regional, or federal
scale as the locus of policymaking. Instead, choosing between the state
and regional scale also implicates a fundamental choice between electric-
ity markets or regulation as the fundamental driver of decarbonization.
States that turn RPSs or carbon pricing over to RTOs must be willing to
allow RTO governance to dictate the terms of these policies going for-
ward. To relinquish control to a regional electricity market is thus to
authorize a diminishment in the suite of tools and scope of control avail-
able to publicly manage decarbonization.
3. The Risk of Aggrandizing Market Control. — There is an obvious
objection to the argument made in the previous subsection: Why assume
that if states were to give regional markets some control over achieving
climate change goals, they could not continue to shape decarbonization’s
trajectory through complementary side policies if necessary? This argu-
ment relates to an argument economists often make about the risks of
mixing policy aims: Why not let markets take care of decarbonization as
cheaply as possible and then let states craft separate policies to accomplish
their additional aims? Wouldn’t this be better than letting states design
these inefficient, multifaceted policies that attempt to mash together the
goals of decarbonization with social justice and economic growth?250
cratic experimentalism,” in which localities experiment in government service provision
and central regulators facilitate learning from one another’s experimentation).
248. See N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 158 FERC ¶
61,137 (Feb. 3, 2017), 2017 WL 496267, at *12 (Bay, Comm’r, concurring) (“In our consti-
tutional order, states are rightly celebrated for being laboratories for experimentation.
Among other things, those laboratories may incentivize the development of needed
energy infrastructure, the deployment of innovative technologies, or the establishment of
Renewable Portfolio Standards.” (footnote omitted)).
249. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 6, at 815 (explaining how state diversity in
electricity governance has led to “interesting examples of policy innovation”).
250. See Eric A. Posner & David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice 169–88 (2010)
(discussing the “ethical obligations of wealthy nations” in climate change policies); cf.
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of
Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821, 822–26
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The response to this argument again revolves around the patholo-
gies of electricity markets, and in particular, the way these markets oper-
ate under shared state and federal jurisdiction.251 In brief, the challenge
is this: Once a state cedes policy objectives to its regional electricity mar-
ket, the state may suffer limits on its ability to craft supplementary poli-
cies or to reclaim the objectives if it does not like the results the market
produces.
This argument no doubt appears strange at first blush. Why should a
state lose its ability to reclaim control over public-policy objectives, if it
only voluntarily gives the market control over these objectives in the first
place? The complicating factor is a recent line of Supreme Court juris-
prudence interpreting the state–federal boundary in electricity law, which
updates the longstanding principle that “[s]tates may not regulate in
areas where FERC has properly exercised its jurisdiction to determine
just and reasonable wholesale rates.”252
Of particular relevance is the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in
Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, which considered a subsidy scheme
devised by Maryland to incentivize power plants to build in the state.253
Although Maryland’s RTO, PJM, ran a capacity market to ensure future
resource adequacy throughout the region,254 Maryland was frustrated
that the market was not incentivizing any generation to locate in
congested areas of the state, where electricity prices were higher than
average.255 To attract new investment, Maryland “solicited proposals from
various companies for construction of a new gas-fired power plant at a
particular location.”256 It then entered into a “contract for differences”
with the winning bidder, in which it guaranteed the winner a certain
(2000) (advocating for an income-tax system, rather than legal rules, as a means of help-
ing the poor).
251. I do not mean to argue that jurisdictional friction presents the only reason that
states might prefer to create policies jointly aimed at decarbonization and other social
goals. Others have written general rebuttals to the argument that redistributional aims
should be separated from other policy goals. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Climate Justice,
110 Mich. L. Rev. 985, 989 (2012) (reviewing Posner & Weisbach, supra note 250) (“To say
that we should not engage in redistribution unless we can implement the ideal form of
redistribution is really to say that we should not engage in redistribution at all.”); Lee
Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction 5
(Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 489, 2014) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (arguing the high political costs of tax redistribution may make it
cheaper to redistribute outside the tax scheme). The jurisdictional churn in electricity law
presents particular reason to eschew using these markets to decarbonize.
252. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988).
253. 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294–95 (2016).
254. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(describing PJM’s capacity market).
255. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294.
256. Id.
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price for any capacity it supplied that also cleared the PJM capacity mar-
ket auction.257
The Supreme Court had no trouble finding that this scheme vio-
lated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, as Maryland’s program
“set[] an interstate wholesale rate” and thus “invade[d] FERC’s regula-
tory turf” under the Federal Power Act.258 In so holding, the Court was
careful to point out that states “of course” maintain authority to “encour-
age construction of new in-state generation.”259 The particular problem
with Maryland’s scheme, though, was that the payments to the generator
were “conditioned on [its] capacity clearing the auction,” such that they
were too closely linked to interstate wholesale prices.260 In contrast, the
Court passed no judgment on “the permissibility of various other
measures States might employ to encourage development of new or
clean generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies,
construction of state-owned generation facilities, or reregulation of the
energy sector.”261
Particularly given this explicit disclaimer, it is hard to know exactly
what Hughes portends for the host of policies that states have designed to
decarbonize electricity.262 There is now a profusion of litigation challeng-
ing state clean-energy policies under Hughes’ logic. Both Illinois and New
York are in the middle of litigation over the legality of their ZEC pro-
grams.263 Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have all faced
similar attacks against their procurement policies for specific clean-
energy resources.264
Whether these policies will ultimately prove acceptable will come
down to how circuit and district courts interpret and apply the standards
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1297. The decision was 8-0, with two concurrences only “to emphasize the
narrowness of the holding.” Hammond, supra note 35.
259. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298.
260. Id. at 1297 n.9.
261. Id. at 1299.
262. See Hammond, supra note 35 (arguing that Hughes “combines an easily predicta-
ble result on the merits with significant uncertainty for states going forward”).
263. See Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2017),
appeal docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017); Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos.
17-cv-01163 & 17-cv-01164, 2017 WL 3008289 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017), appeal docketed sub
nom. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, No. 17-2445 (7th Cir. July 17, 2017).
264. See Riggs v. Curran, 863 F.3d 6, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2017) (dismissing on procedural
grounds a challenge to Rhode Island’s statute seeking to develop offshore wind); Allco
Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2017); Town of Barnstable v. Berwick, 17 F.
Supp. 3d 113, 120–22 (D. Mass. 2014), vacated as moot or unripe, 786 F.3d 130 (1st Cir.
2015) (dismissing a challenge to Massachusetts’s offshore wind-procurement scheme on
the grounds that the relief sought was retroactive and therefore barred by the Eleventh
Amendment).
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articulated in Hughes.265 And courts will have to integrate the Hughes
precedent with two other recent Supreme Court cases dealing with simi-
lar topics: OneOK v. Learjet, Inc.266 and FERC v. Electric Power Supply
Ass’n.267 The Court’s 2016 decision in Electric Power Supply Ass’n affirmed
FERC’s jurisdiction over any practice “directly affecting” wholesale rates,
striking down states’ arguments that FERC had overreached its jurisdic-
tion.268 The year before, in OneOK, the Court clarified that field preemp-
tion of state energy law should turn on an analysis of the purpose of the
state regulation, such that courts should examine “the target at which the
state law aims in determining whether that law is pre-empted.”269
For present purposes, the fallout of Hughes and related precedents is
that there might be substantial consequences to ceding new powers to
regional electricity markets. Hughes made clear that because Maryland
had granted PJM the right to control resource adequacy in the region by
running a capacity market, the state lost some of its ability to concur-
rently strive to achieve the same goals. In contrast, right now RTOs claim
no control over decarbonization. Quite the contrary: They specifically
decry any obligation in this regard. But what if states were to grant their
electricity-market operator control over decarbonization? Then, under
the logic of Hughes and OneOK, states might be preempted from tying
any state policies too closely to whatever market construct for decarbon-
ization the RTO devised. In particular, states would have to be careful not
to impermissibly “tether” their policies or prices for clean energy to the
results of regional clean-energy or carbon markets.270
To be sure, even if a state decided to allow decarbonization to proceed
through its RTO, many traditional state methods of encouraging
decarbonization would likely not be threatened—including tax breaks,
financial incentives, and straightforward subsidies. Although part of the
picture, these methods have not emerged as the predominant tools that
states use to regulate climate. Instead, the most important state policies are
those that proceed through rate regulation, including RPSs, ZECs,
regional carbon prices, procurement mandates, and ratepayer support of
certain technologies.271 There is a reason that these policies predominate:
265. Hammond, supra note 35 (“Hughes doesn’t really tell us which state initiatives will
survive future Supremacy Clause challenges and which will fail.”).
266. 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
267. 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
268. Id. at 760.
269. OneOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599 (emphasis omitted). Interestingly, though, the Court
did not rely on OneOK’s test in deciding Hughes the following year.
270. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (“Nothing
in this opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States from encouraging
production of new or clean generation through measures ‘untethered to a generator’s
wholesale market participation.’” (quoting Brief for Respondents at 40, Hughes, 136 S. Ct.
1288 (Nos. 14-614, 14-623), 2016 WL 183803)).
271. See Rossi, Carbon Taxation, supra note 8, at 298–306.
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They are funded not through general taxation but through the rate base.
They are, in other words, a form of covert “taxation by regulation,”272
which serves as a more politically feasible way to meet decarbonization
aims than direct taxation.273
Under the Hughes framework, these popular forms of “carbon taxa-
tion by regulation” would be particularly threatened by RTO jurisdiction
over decarbonization. Regional carbon-pricing and state procurement
schemes would be at risk if they were designed in ways that pegged their
pricing to market outcomes.274 Even Renewable Portfolio Standards—the
central mechanism of state clean-energy policy to date—might prove
vulnerable under an expansive interpretation of Hughes, should a state
wish to pursue an RPS design that differs from a regional clean-energy
procurement market.275
A hypothetical example helps illustrate these concerns. Consider the
case in which a state wishes to promote a particular type of renewable
resource in the state that its RPS is inadequately incentivizing—say, off-
shore wind. Right now, in order to promote more offshore wind, a state
would be free to offer that generator a long-term premium on top of REC
prices that fluctuates based on how much the generator is able to earn
from the REC market.276 The state might find this particular method for
272. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 22, 23
(1971) (describing the phenomenon of “internal subsidies,” where policy aims are accom-
plished through the use of rate regulation); see also Rossi, Carbon Taxation, supra note 8,
at 278–80 (explaining how these climate change-related tools are a new version of Posner’s
classic internal subsidization).
273. Whether rate regulation presents a superior mechanism for accomplishing decar-
bonization as compared to more general taxation is a question beyond the scope of this
Article. Rossi provides a partial defense of such policies in Carbon Taxation by Regulation,
supra note 8. Rossi argues that carbon taxation by regulation can and does function as an
effective—albeit fragmented—substitute for carbon regulation but suggests that several
reforms would help it do so more effectively. See id. at 323–41.
274. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
275. Part IV describes why an expansive reading of Hughes, of the sort that would inval-
idate RPSs, is unlikely. Nevertheless, the concern is a live one, even absent RTO
subsummation of decarbonization goals. Several parties in the ZEC litigation have worried
that if ZECs are illegal, so too are RPSs. See Joel Eisen, The New (Clear?) Electricity
Federalism: Federal Preemption of States’ “Zero Emissions Credit” Programs, 45 Ecology
L.Q. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 18) [hereinafter Eisen, Electricity Federalism]
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (collecting commentators raising this concern).
Many participants in the ZEC litigation, however, assert that ZECs are different in kind
from RPSs and other state policies. See Proposed Brief of Amicus Curiae American Wind
Energy Ass’n in Support of Neither Party at 2, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, No. 1:17-cv-
01163 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2017). In his forthcoming article, Professor Joel Eisen argues for a
reading of Hughes and related cases that would invalidate ZECs but allow state RPS policies
to stand. See Eisen, Electricity Federalism, supra (manuscript at 19) (“ZECs aim directly at
remedying the revenue shortfall on the wholesale markets. RECs do not, because they are
designed with reference to environmental attributes, not wholesale market prices.”).
276. See WSPP Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061 (Apr. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 1395532, at *4 (find-
ing that the separate sale of RECs does not fall within the Commission’s jurisdiction).
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promoting certain renewables quite attractive, as it would create long-
term investor certainty without complicating the state’s RPS or causing
residents to overpay.277 But if renewables procurement were to become
RTO administered and FERC jurisdictional (through proposals such as a
regional clean-energy market), it is unclear whether such a scheme
would survive. It might, under the logic of Hughes and OneOK, be too
closely tethered in purpose or effect to the newly FERC-jurisdictional
clean-energy market.
Less hypothetically, consider New York’s current study of adopting a
single-state RTO carbon adder. There, regulators have proposed that a
market carbon price and the state REC program can and should operate
simultaneously.278 To facilitate this dual scheme, an August 2017 study by
the Brattle Group proposed that “[f]uture REC contracts could be struc-
tured so that the price adjusts automatically with changes in carbon
prices, mitigating regulatory uncertainty associated with a carbon
charge.”279 Again, under the logic of Hughes, it is not clear that such teth-
ering would be permissible.280
Of course, the risks that Hughes and related decisions pose remain
largely inchoate. As such, it is hard to know how to factor them into
pressing decisions on decarbonization policy and markets. This Article’s
final section clarifies how states might integrate these developing risks
into decisionmaking about the future of their climate change policies.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT ELECTRICITY-LAW DEBATES
So far, this Article has explored some dangers in using regional elec-
tricity markets as a tool to accomplish the “social project” of decarboniza-
tion. At the same time, the Article does not intend to give short shrift to
these markets’ potency as a potential least-cost solution or as a bargaining
tool in interstate climate negotiations. To evaluate these tradeoffs, section
IV.A first lays out some variables to help states assess whether regional
electricity-market integration of decarbonization objectives is in their
best interest. Sections IV.B and IV.C then briefly explore options for
regionalizing climate policy outside RTOs and how markets might adapt
to accommodate such schemes. Finally, section IV.D examines what this
Article’s argument portends for laggard states, as opposed to states
taking the lead on climate change.
277. See supra note 95.
278. Newell et al., supra note 194, at iv (“We assume the carbon charge is designed to
complement (rather than replace) . . . existing policies that contribute to
decarbonization.”).
279. Id. at 46.
280. The legality of this proposal might turn on structural details, including the extent
to which the state required such automatic price-adjustment mechanisms in REC
contracting.
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A. Deciding Whether to Regionalize Through Electricity Markets
The limitations and pathologies of regional electricity markets iden-
tified in this Article suggest that states should assess three variables in
deciding whether to aggressively pursue the integration of climate goals
into these markets: (1) the relative priority of advancing least-cost
solutions; (2) the evolution of legal doctrine surrounding federal–state
jurisdiction over electricity policy; and (3) regional politics.
1. Relative Priority of Least-Cost Solutions. — Much of this Article’s anal-
ysis has centered on the ways in which state climate policies evince an
understanding of decarbonization as a social project with multifaceted
goals. State climate policies illustrate attention to distributional conse-
quences, the risks and externalities associated with various low-carbon
technologies, and the ways in which transforming energy can also trans-
form state economies. But leading states are also pursuing ambitious
targets, which are likely to cost substantial sums to achieve.281 It could be
that as implementation progresses, affordability will become the
dominant priority for states pursuing decarbonization.
Accordingly, the first question state policymakers considering
regional integration might ask is: How important is least-cost decarboniza-
tion to state residents, as compared to a more managed decarbonization
trajectory that incorporates other goals? The more the scale tilts in favor
of affordability as a central criterion, the greater the benefits of regional-
ization through electricity markets.
Understanding decarbonization as a social project also points to
some useful conclusions about what kind of regional market design for
decarbonization states might prefer. In particular, a Forward Clean
Energy Market in which states can funnel their decarbonization prefer-
ences into the market design presents less of a relinquishment of state
control than does a region-wide climate price.282 Of course, a clean-
energy market also presents a less thoroughly efficient solution—again
highlighting the importance of prioritizing state aims relating to
decarbonization.
One final word regarding temporality is in order. Even if a state finds
that a particular market construct for achieving decarbonization might
perfectly achieve its aims at time zero, there is a long-term risk to ceding
such control to the market. Given the scale of the enterprise of deep
281. See Ron Binz et al., Practicing Risk-Aware Electricity Regulation: What Every State
Regulator Needs to Know 5–6 (2012), http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/05/ceres-binzsedano-riskawareregulation-2012-apr-19.pdf [http://perma.cc/5RJQ-
DQF5] (predicting that retail electricity prices will “rise sharply” in the next twenty years
due to the level of investment needed in the U.S. electricity sector); James H. Williams et
al., Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States 1, 24 (2014),
http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/US-Deep-Decarbonization-Report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W45R-MF7Z] (estimating the median price of cutting carbon dioxide
emissions 80% from 1990 levels by 2050 to be between $160 billion and $650 billion).
282. See supra section III.A for a detailed description of these two policy options.
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decarbonization, a state’s goals and preferences regarding the shape of
decarbonization may well evolve over time.283 If state aims change such
that affordability ceases to be the priority criterion, a state may have lim-
ited recourse once it has ceded decarbonization imperatives to the mar-
ket, other than full-scale market exit.
This temporal constraint appears particularly acute with respect to
carbon-pricing schemes, which may “lock in” investments that states do
not want their ratepayers to support.284 A regional carbon price would
likely incentivize near-term investments in new combined-cycle natural
gas facilities, which could displace higher-emitting fossil fuel facilities.285
But states may not want a carbon-price scheme to help finance construc-
tion of these types of facilities, given their inability to contribute to long-
term “deep decarbonization” targets.286 States weighing market integra-
tion should thus carefully evaluate not only short-term goals but also the
compatibility of a market scheme with their long-term aims.
2. Evolving Legal Risk. — The second variable that can help shape
state decisions regarding decarbonization and electricity markets is that
of evolving legal risk. As traced in section III.E, the Hughes decision has
opened up a new line of attack on state climate policies. How these cases
play out in the coming years should influence decisions about whether to
decarbonize through regional markets.
Consider first the outcome in which courts give Hughes its narrowest
possible reading. Courts in this instance would hold that Hughes
preempts only those state policies that explicitly condition receipt of some
benefit on clearing wholesale electricity markets.287 In that case, states
might feel more confident in ceding some authority over decarboniza-
tion to regional electricity markets, because they could assume such shared
authority would place limited constraints upon state power. A state in this
283. See, e.g., Weiner, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 159, at 5 (expressing
concern that wholesale market integration of climate policy “would likely hinder States in
adapting to changing times”); cf. Mhairi Aitken, Why We Still Don’t Understand the Social
Aspects of Wind Power: A Critique of Key Assumptions Within the Literature, 38 Energy
Pol’y 1834, 1835 (2010) (noting research that regarding nuclear power plants, “public
attitudes are not stable but rather adapt and change in relation to events or changing
situations”).
284. See generally Karen C. Seto et al., Carbon Lock-in: Types, Causes, and Policy
Implications, 41 Ann. Rev. Env’t. & Resources 425 (2016) (describing the path-dependent
processes that prevent the emergence of low-carbon alternatives).
285. See Newell et al., supra note 194, at 33.
286. Cf. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 168, at 421–22 (suggesting reasons for states to
target a few promising cleantech options in their climate investment).
287. Cf. Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos. 17-cv-01163 & 17-cv-01164, 2017 WL
3008289, at *13 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017), appeal docketed sub nom. Elec. Power Supply
Ass’n v. Star, No. 17-2445 (7th Cir. July 17, 2017) (“Hughes should not be extended to
invalidate state laws that do not include an express condition, but that in practice (and
when combined with other market forces), have the effect of conditioning payment on
clearing the wholesale auction.”).
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scenario would likely maintain considerable ability to shape its decarbon-
ization trajectory, so long as complementary state policies were not
explicitly conditioned on certain regional decarbonization market
outcomes.
Now consider the (in my opinion, less likely288) outcome in which
courts use the logic of Hughes to strike down RPSs, nuclear subsidies, and
special procurement orders as intruding on federal jurisdiction over
regional electricity markets. In that case, states would be faced with a
conundrum. On the one hand, states would be left with considerably
fewer climate policy options other than using regional electricity markets,
since their primary policy levers to date would be impermissible. On the
other hand, a decision to cede decarbonization objectives to the market
would likely take even more policy options off the table, given that
Hughes and its progeny in this scenario would stand for the proposition
that states are prohibited from enacting a broad range of policies that
too thoroughly impact regional markets. In this case, states would be
faced with difficult choices between returning to the drawing board in
terms of how to craft state climate policies, or giving in to the pressure to
let the markets do their decarbonization work for them.
Finally, consider the emerging middle-ground scenario, in which
courts develop a sliding scale for determining which state policies are too
closely “tethered” to wholesale markets.289 Early indications are that
courts are likely to head in this direction. In June 2017, the Second
Circuit became the first circuit court to interpret Hughes, ruling on a
challenge to Connecticut’s use of its procurement laws to encourage
more solar energy.290 The plaintiff in that case argued that Connecticut’s
procurement scheme should be preempted under the logic of Hughes,
since the state was directing its utilities to enter into a specific wholesale
contract and therefore interfering with federal jurisdiction over
wholesale electricity pricing.291 The Second Circuit dodged the direct
preemption argument, instead finding that Connecticut’s law did not
compel utilities to enter into contracts with the winning bidders of the
procurement process. 292 The court thus left open the question of
whether a state scheme that more clearly required utilities to enter into
contracts with certain renewable resources would be preempted. Never-
theless, the court took a moment to opine on Hughes, observing that
Connecticut’s scheme appears quite different from Maryland’s failed
program, given that Connecticut’s program involves traditional bilateral
contracts that are in no way conditioned on certain resources clearing
288. See Peskoe, supra note 35, at 41 (“Renewable portfolio standards . . . have co-
existed with FERC-regulated markets for nearly two decades with little significant legal
controversy.”); supra note 276.
289. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016).
290. See Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2017).
291. See id. at 86, 92.
292. See id. at 97–98.
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the regional capacity auction. 293 As such, Connecticut’s contracts
resemble “precisely what the Hughes court placed outside its limited
holding.”294
In July 2017, U.S. District Courts for the Northern District of Illinois
and the Southern District of New York reached similarly limited conclu-
sions in dismissing lawsuits against Illinois’s and New York’s ZEC pro-
grams.295 The first opinion to be issued concerned Illinois. Plaintiffs in
that case argued, inter alia, that the ZEC program violated the Hughes
standard for preemption because it was too closely tied to wholesale
prices, since Illinois’s program allowed for the price of ZECs to be
adjusted based on predictions of wholesale prices.296 The court rejected
this argument, reasoning that basing ZEC prices on future projected
wholesale prices is not an interference with the wholesale market that
rises to the level of Hughes.297
The Southern District of New York reached the same conclusion
regarding that state’s program. Its opinion emphasized that Hughes was
focused on the “impermissible tether” of required participation in the
wholesale market and that New York’s ZEC program required nothing of
the sort.298 Moreover, the court observed, the ZEC program “does not
guarantee a certain wholesale price that displaces the market-determined
price” but rather simply places a separate value on the environmental
attributes of nuclear.299
The Illinois and New York decisions have been appealed to the
Seventh and Second Circuits, respectively.300 These courts are now tasked
with drawing a delicate line between schemes that come too close to elec-
tricity markets in design or in purpose301 and those that stay further away
from pegging their schemes to market prices and functions. The fact that
this jurisprudence appears to be shaping itself around this inquiry should
293. Id. at 99, 102.
294. Id. at 99.
295. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2017),
appeal docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017); Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos.
17-cv-1163 & 17-cv-1164, 2017 WL 3008289, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017), appeal docketed
sub nom. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, No. 17-2445 (7th Cir. July 17, 2017).
296. Star, 2017 WL 3008289, at *4, *10.
297. Id. at *11. The court also rejected an argument that receipt of ZECs was implicitly
tied to participation in wholesale markets. Id. at *12–13.
298. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 569.
299. Id. at *17. For this reason, the court found the scheme indistinguishable from
RPS and RECs, which it noted FERC has long determined fall outside its jurisdiction. Id. at
*13.
300. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, appeal docketed, No. 17-2654 (2d Cir. Aug. 25,
2017); Star, 2017 WL 3008289, appeal docketed, No. 17-2445 (7th Cir. July 18, 2017).
301. On the “purpose” point, it is interesting to note that both courts highlighted this
line of inquiry from OneOK and emphasized the extent to which the state ZEC programs
had environmental goals that were quite distinct from wholesale-market aims. See
Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 571; Star, 2017 WL 3008289, at *10–11.
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at least give states pause about ceding control over decarbonization to
the markets. In doing so, states risk carving out more room for their poli-
cies to become constrained by regional markets’ integration of the pro-
ject of decarbonization.
3. Regional Politics. — One final variable relevant to state decisionma-
king on integrating climate change aims into regional electricity markets
is that of regional politics. This Article painted regional electricity-market
governance as suffering from pathologies that are likely to yield least-
common-denominator solutions.302 This potentiality is least problematic
in one-state RTOs like New York. That state is more likely to be able to
translate its climate goals into a market-based scheme that fully reflects its
decarbonization aims—leaving one fewer variable for state regulators
there to contend with.303 In multistate regions, though, the challenge of
watering down is quite real. But even there, perhaps aggressive states
might use market integration as a bargaining chip in negotiations with
other states that are worried about state climate policies’ destabilizing
effects on the regional market. In particular, they might suggest to a
recalcitrant state: “Up the ambition of your RPS five percent, or allow the
market to use a higher price on carbon, and we will commit to pursuing
regional decarbonization through the market.” It is not clear whether
laggard states see enough appeal to using electricity markets that such a
promise could motivate them to greater action on climate change. But
the more states find this outcome plausible, the more appealing using
regional electricity markets to decarbonize might be.
B. Thinking Outside the Market: State-Led Climate Policy Regionalization
Much of the appeal of using regional electricity markets to accom-
plish climate change aims comes from the opportunity they present for
capitalizing on the efficiencies of a larger, regional market construct. But
if that’s the draw for states, then electricity markets are far from the only
method available. Many states have already devised regional solutions
through cooperative arrangements that avoid the pathologies of electric-
ity markets.304
302. See supra sections III.B–.C.
303. Such is particularly the case if state regulators retain control over establishing the
level of carbon pricing. Cf. Newell et al., supra note 194, at 22 (dodging the political ques-
tion of how New York’s price might be set in noting that “[p]olicymakers should define a
process for determining the price and modifying it over time” and that “[t]his process
could be led or informed by the NYPSC and other state agencies”).
304. See Sarah Hofmann, Comm’r, Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd., Exec. Comm. Nat’l Council on
Elec. Policy (NCEP), Statement at FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale
Markets Operated by ISO-New England, Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., at 3 (May 1, 2017), http://electricitypolicy.org/
wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2017/05/Statement-of-Commissioner-Hofmann-for-FERC-
tech-conference-on-Ma-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/89QD-L2HX] (arguing to FERC that
states “are well suited to collaboratively working out answers to the policy questions”).
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Two successful examples predominate.305 The first is a regional cap-
and-trade program, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),
which nine northeastern states have been running since 2009.306 In this
scheme, participating states devised a “memorandum of understanding”
that set forth negotiated carbon-reduction targets for each state, along
with a plan for each state to adopt legislation approving of the regional
scheme.307 All states were able to pass such legislation, bringing the
scheme into force. Under the program as it is currently run, each genera-
tor that emits carbon pollution must purchase enough credits to cover its
emissions from a region-wide auction.308
RGGI has coexisted for almost ten years alongside the PJM, NYISO,
and ISO-New England regional electricity markets with scant complaints
regarding market interference. Generators simply factor the cost of
RGGI allowances into their expenses, on which they base their bids into
regional electricity markets.309 Clearly this requirement to at least par-
tially internalize the costs of carbon emissions has an impact on the
prices at which these generators offer electricity to the regional markets,
but no one argues that it creates a distortionary effect.310 RGGI thus stands
as proof that it is possible to concoct a regional pricing scheme outside
the regional electricity market without causing undue interference.
RGGI is not an unmitigated success—otherwise, many of its partici-
pants would hardly now be considering building carbon pricing into their
regional electricity markets. RGGI’s main problem, quite simply, is that
the caps that states were able to agree upon for RGGI—and the resultant
allowance prices—have been too low to accomplish the most ambitious
states’ decarbonization goals.311 Nevertheless, RGGI has functioned as a
305. States were also actively pursuing regional solutions to Clean Power Plan compli-
ance until the Trump Administration announced plans to dismantle these regulations. See
Susan F. Tierney & Paul J. Hibbard, Analysis Grp., Carbon Control and Competitive
Wholesale Electricity Markets: Compliance Paths for Efficient Market Outcomes 22–26
(2015), http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing/clean_
power_plan_markets_may_2015_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/DEY4-WC2B] (encouraging
states to adopt regional Clean Power Plan compliance plans that track market borders);
see also Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (Mar. 31, 2017) (instructing
the EPA Administrator to review the Clean Power Plan with an eye toward withdrawal).
306. See RGGI, supra note 75.
307. RGGI, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Memorandum of Understanding 1–11
(2005), http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf [http://perma.cc/PVB6-BL3Y];
see also Craig, supra note 85, at 821 (explaining RGGI’s structure).
308. Fact Sheet: RGGI CO2 Allowance Auctions, RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_
Auctions_in_Brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/6YQB-MD23] (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
309. See Peskoe, supra note 35, at 44. Peskoe notes, however, that RGGI, too, might
face increased risk of preemption if participating states pursue a FERC-jurisdictional car-
bon price. See id.
310. See Tierney & Hibbard, supra note 305, at 25 (asserting that RGGI “allows for
seamless implementation in centralized wholesale power markets”).
311. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 154, at 6 n.12 (“[T]he RGGI program is
not sufficient to meet New York’s 50 percent renewables and 40 percent [greenhouse gas]
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base policy upon which states can build the myriad other decarboniza-
tion policies discussed in this Article. And RGGI can function in this
manner because a regional “memorandum of understanding” creates no
risk of wresting away state power to address decarbonization simultane-
ously at the state level. At the same time, building upon years of trust
among states, RGGI has twice succeeded in lowering its program carbon
cap, thus raising the cost of allowance prices and strengthening the
program’s effects.312 RGGI’s structure thus presents an appealing alterna-
tive to electricity-market integration for states intent on regionalization.
A second example of regional cooperation on decarbonization out-
side of electricity markets comes from regional trading of RECs—the
renewable energy credits that utilities use to demonstrate compliance
with state RPS.313 To date, most REC markets are single state—thus creating
what many critics have bemoaned as unnecessarily constricted trading
pools.314 But the New England states have created a regional market for
RECs that enlarges the pool of RECs available to create a more stable,
fluid market.315 They have done so through state laws that allow for gen-
erators to satisfy state RPS obligations with RECs purchased from any
generator in the region that meets the state-specific definition of “renew-
able,” or similarly, from a renewable generator outside the New England
region that can demonstrate that its renewable energy was imported into
the region.316 In this way, New England already orchestrates regional
cooperation on renewable energy.
reduction goals, and changing RGGI to achieve more ambitious goals ‘is not within the
State’s unilateral control.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Clean Energy Standard Order,
supra note 99, at 133)).
312. See RGGI, Summary of RGGI Model Rule Changes: February 2013, at 3 (2013),
http://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Design-Archive/Model-Rule/2012-Program-
Review-Update/Summary_of_Model_Rule_Changes_02_07_13.pdf [http://perma.cc/BDS4-
P46G]; Dale Bryk, East Coast States Strengthen Power Plant Pollution-Cutting Program,
Set Model for Nation, NRDC Expert Blog (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.nrdc.org/experts/
dale-bryk/east-coast-states-strengthen-power-plant-pollution-cutting-program-set-model
[http://perma.cc/56SH-4SJH]; Bruce Ho & Jackson Morris, RGGI Agrees to Cut Power
Plant Pollution by Another 30%, NRDC Expert Blog (Aug. 23, 2017),
http://www.nrdc.org/experts/bruce-ho/rggi-agrees-cut-power-plant-pollution-another-30
[http://perma.cc/V5BH-WW39].
313. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
314. See Crandall, supra note 86, at 896; Davies, Power Forward, supra note 84, at
1343–44; Mack et al., supra note 86, at 18; Mormann, supra note 36, at 1644–45.
315. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-245a(b) (2017); see also Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee,
861 F.3d 82, 89–90 (2d Cir. 2017) (describing the program); Mack et al., supra note 86, at
20 (same).
316. See, e.g., Vt. Pub. Serv. Dep’t, Types of Renewable Energy Credits in New
England: A Summary 1 (2015) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). A renewable energy
generator outside the region can satisfy this requirement with help from a regional track-
ing system that monitors the renewable energy imported from surrounding ISOs and
other entities. See id.; see also Klee, 861 F.3d at 92.
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These programs suggest that regional cooperation can flourish with-
out having to relinquish control to quasi-private governance organiza-
tions that are not under state oversight. To be sure, both RGGI and New
England’s REC-sharing arrangement carry their own legal risk.
Commentators frequently point to the dangers of both the Compact
Clause317 and the Dormant Commerce Clause318 when it comes to pro-
grams like these.319
These risks are not theoretical—both RGGI and the New England
REC program have faced lawsuits on these grounds.320 But for now,
courts have sided with the states. One New York case brought against
RGGI on Compact Clause grounds settled;321 another was thrown out on
procedural grounds.322 New England’s regional REC scheme recently
received substantial validation on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds,
in the same Second Circuit opinion that upheld the state’s renewables
procurement regime.323 With these holdings in place, both a regional
317. The Compact Clause prohibits states from entering “into any Agreement or
Compact with another State” without the consent of Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. But
not all compacts are prohibited—the critical question, as formulated by the Supreme
Court in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 493 (1978), is whether
the agreement increases the “political power” of participating states.
318. The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from enacting measures
grounded in economic protectionism, which “benefit in-state economic interests by bur-
dening out-of-state competitors.” Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 273–74 (1988)).
319. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 85, at 771, 786, 820 (highlighting potential constitu-
tional infirmities with RGGI and regional RECs); Note, The Compact Clause and the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1958, 1965 (2007). See generally
Ferrey et al., supra note 92 (examining constitutional challenges to a feed-in tariff for
renewable power).
320. See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 920–21 (8th Cir. 2016) (striking
down Minnesota’s law providing that “‘no person’ shall ‘import or commit to import’
power from a large new energy facility located ‘outside the state’” on Dormant Commerce
Clause grounds).
321. See Consent Decree, Indeck Corinth, L.P. v. Paterson, No. 5280-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 23, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Christopher Rizzo, Cap-and-Trade
Under Attack Around the Nation, GreenLaw Blog (June 29, 2011),
http://greenlaw.blogs.pace.edu/2011/06/29/cap-and-trade-under-attack-around-the-nation
[http://perma.cc/TS9E-AA6N] (providing a report of the settlement).
322. Thrun v. Cuomo, 976 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (dismissing the case
because “certain claims are time-barred and the remaining claims have been rendered
moot”).
323. Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs alleged that
the New England regional REC-sharing program harmed their interests in a Georgia solar
facility, which was not allowed to sell RECs to Connecticut utilities for purposes of RPS
compliance. The Second Circuit found no merit in this contention, determining that a
Georgia REC and a New England REC are in fact “different products” that can legally be
treated differently. Id. at 103. Underlying this finding was the recognition that
“Connecticut consumers’ need for a more diversified and renewable energy supply, acces-
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cap-and-trade program and a regional market for RECs appear to stand
on relatively firm legal ground. Of course, it could still come to pass that
RPS programs themselves get struck down or that another circuit ana-
lyzes regional RECs’ constitutionality differently. But the legal risk inher-
ent in pursuing these types of regional solutions comes for states with an
attendant gain—not having to relinquish public control over the course
and content of these important decarbonization programs.
C. Designing Markets to Accommodate, Rather than Achieve, State Policies
The problem, of course, with pursuing regional solutions outside
markets is that it returns the states to the problem animating current dis-
putes: the fact that extra-market solutions, whether pursued at the
regional or state level, may distort and ultimately dismantle electricity
markets.324 Here, then, a separate set of proposals for how to manage
these concerns is salient. While many are deep in exploration of how to
use electricity markets to achieve decarbonization, there is a second strand
of proposed reforms that would focus on redesigning electricity markets
not to subsume state climate policies but merely to accommodate them.
Such accommodation would require regional markets to embrace the
coexistence of manifold state policies in a way that has not always been
the case to date and to intentionally mold their rules to support the con-
tinued viability of markets in the face of these state policies.325
There are many ideas about how markets might be refined to better
accommodate state climate policies, and most proposals tend to be quite
technical. The basic idea behind them, though, is this: Regions should
identify what current market signals are failing to achieve, and rework
the market construct to achieve these aims. That might be through pric-
ing some “attribute” of electricity that markets do not currently value—
for example, markets might pay generators for their ability to “ramp” up
and down quickly to balance out renewables.326 Or, it might be through
sible to them directly through their regional grid or indirectly through adjacent control
areas, would not be served by RECs produced . . . in Georgia.” Id. at 105.
324. See supra section I.C.
325. To be fair, regions have already been doing some accommodation for years,
through policies such as exemptions from the “minimum offer price rule,” Kavulla, supra
note 56, which requires that “new generators bid . . . at or above a specified price in
certain circumstances,” Rossi, Brave New Path, supra note 36, at 424. See also N.J. Bd. of
Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 85–86, 93–94 (3d Cir. 2014) (describing the minimum
offer price rule and upholding PJM’s determination not to exempt state-supported
resources from it any longer). But the current suite of accommodations is clearly inade-
quate, given the worries documented about wholesale market interference in this Article.
326. MISO and CAISO have introduced “ramping products,” which compensate
resources for their ability to ramp up and down quickly. Chang et al., supra note 119, at 25.
To read more about how other markets might pursue similar programs, see PJM, Proposed
Enhancements to Energy Price Formation 2, 5 (2017), http://www.pjm.com/-/media/
library/reports-notices/special-reports/20171115-proposed-enhancements-to-energy-price-
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redesigning capacity markets to pay different prices to state-supported
resources—like renewables and nuclear energy—and resources that are
unsupported by these policies.327
The Department of Energy’s October 2017 proposed “Grid
Resiliency Pricing Rule” can be understood as one such attempt to refine
market structures 328—albeit, in the view of many experts, a poorly
designed one. In that notice of proposed rulemaking, the Department
asked FERC to consider providing out-of-market payments to “fuel-
secure” resources that it believes are undervalued by current regional
market-pricing structures.329 In particular, this proposed rule would have
provided additional compensation to coal and nuclear plants in
recognition of the “resiliency” benefits330 that substantial on-site storage
of fuel can provide.331
formation.ashx [http://perma.cc/7UGN-BVE7]. Cf. Hogan, supra note 121, at 8 (pointing
out some of the challenges with this strategy).
327. See PJM, Capacity Market Repricing Proposal 1 (2017) [hereinafter PJM, Repricing
Proposal], http://pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170502-
capacity-market-repricing-proposal.ashx/ [http://perma.cc/K2UQ-CB3P] (proposing a
“two-stage capacity auction” in which state-supported resources are allowed to clear the
market but do not set the price to be paid to other resources); Peskoe, supra note 35, at 16
(detailing these proposals); see also NEPOOL, Framework Document Two-Tier FCM
Pricing 1–2 (2016), http://nepool.com/uploads/IMAPP_20160914_Framework_NRG_
rev.pdf [http://perma.cc/GND8-FM36] (describing a two-stage forward capacity auction);
CMEEC, FERC Technical Conference, supra note 240, at 4 (proposing alternatively a
“bilateral-residual capacity market structure”); American Municipal Power, FERC
Technical Conference, supra note 112, at 4 (same). Identifying what counts as “state sup-
port” and what doesn’t is likely to be a contentious area for negotiation under this pro-
posal. See PJM, Repricing Proposal, supra, at 4 (describing how PJM will distinguish
“actionable from non-actionable subsidies”); Chen, FERC Technical Conference, supra
note 112, at 1 (worrying these proposals will unfairly focus on the “more visible” state
policies for renewables).
328. See Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940, 46,941–45 (proposed Oct.
10, 2017) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
329. Id. at 46,945.
330. The concept of “grid resiliency” lacks a clear definition. The National Academy
of Sciences has explained it in this way: “Resilience is not just about lessening the likeli-
hood that [grid] outages will occur. It is also about limiting the scope and impact of out-
ages when they do occur, restoring power rapidly afterwards, and learning from these
experiences to better deal with events in the future.” Comm. on Enhancing the Resilience of
the Nation’s Elec. Power Transmission and Distribution Sys., Nat’l Acad. Sci., Enhancing the
Resilience of the Nation’s Electricity System 1 (2017), http://www.naesb.org/misc/nas_
report.pdf [http://perma.cc/JH9W-DPEU]. In DOE’s proposed rule, the agency “does
not define ‘resiliency,’ nor has the Commission ever used that word in connection with
wholesale rates.” Harvard Environmental Policy Initiative, Comments on Proposed Grid
Resiliency Pricing Rule, FERC Docket No. RM18-1-000, at 1 (Oct. 18, 2017), http://
environment.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Harvard-EPI-DOE-NOPR-
Comment.pdf [http://perma.cc/YA3N-PVXD].
331. See Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 46,942–43. Note, however, that
the DOE NOPR differs from state nuclear support schemes in one critical way: It does not
recognize the climate change benefits of nuclear power in the least.
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In January 2018, FERC terminated this proposed rulemaking,
explaining that the proposal was legally insufficient because it failed to
demonstrate that regions were experiencing any resiliency challenges
that resulted in “unjust and unreasonable” RTO tariffs.332 In FERC’s
termination order, several commissioners sharply critiqued the
Department of Energy’s plan for its potential to unravel energy markets.
In particular, they suggested that the Department had used the amor-
phous goal of “resiliency” to justify payments to two favored resources
that do not clearly provide grid resiliency benefits, while ignoring other
resources that might better provide grid resiliency.333 In place of this mis-
guided attempt, the Commission initiated a new rulemaking “to specifi-
cally evaluate the resilience of the bulk power system in the regions oper-
ated by [RTOs],” as a first step in determining whether there is a real
need to redesign markets to respond to resiliency challenges.334
Through these new twists, the Department of Energy’s controversial
proposal could ultimately prompt regional solutions that strengthen
markets while responding to concerns over ever-expanding state resource
subsidization. A frank reckoning with exactly what “resilience” services
are lacking from the grid and what resources and investments might pro-
vide them should help regions determine if there is some “resiliency
attribute” that markets currently undervalue and whether there is a mar-
ket-grounded methodology for rewarding any resources that provide that
value.335 If pursued in this manner, an RTO’s creation of an additional
332. See Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and
Establishing Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (Jan. 8, 2018), 2018 WL 345249,
at *5.
333. See id. at *12 (LaFleur, Comm’r, concurring); id. at *16 (Glick, Comm’r,
concurring); Comments of the PUC of the State of California, Grid Reliability and
Resilience Pricing, FERC Docket No. RM18-1-000, at 1, 4–6 (Oct. 23, 2017) (“Evidence
regarding reliability in the electricity industry cannot support the argument that baseload
power is the central means for providing reliability and resiliency.”); Chang et al., supra
note 119, at 16–17; Jody Freeman & Joseph Goffman, Opinion, Rick Perry’s Anti-Market
Plan to Help Coal, N.Y. Times (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/
opinion/rick-perry-coal-antimarket.html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“Selectively subsidizing coal and nuclear power is not the most obvious or best way to
bolster the grid against sudden events.”).
334. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and
Establishing Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012, 2018 WL 345249, at *1.
335. The comments of bipartisan former FERC commissioners on the DOE NOPR
make a similar suggestion:
We strongly encourage the Commission to use this opportunity created
by the Secretary to identify attributes of the current competitive market
system that need to be improved, to crisply define them and either
modify the current published proposal or initiate regional proceedings
to examine resilience issues and consider the need for market rule
changes.
Bipartisan Former FERC Commissioners, Comments on Proposed Grid Resiliency Pricing
Rule, FERC Docket No. RM18-1-000, at 7 (Oct. 19, 2017), http://s3.amazonaws.com/
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revenue stream for currently undervalued “resiliency” characteristics
could help offset any resilience challenges that state-supported renewa-
bles might pose for the grid.336 At the same time, such a reform would
not undermine state climate change goals and programs by selectively
providing payments to the most carbon-polluting resource in the market:
coal.
The Department of Energy’s proposed Grid Resilience Pricing Rule
thus provides a sort of crossroads that underscores this Article’s argu-
ment about why states should be cautious in ceding decarbonization to
RTOs. At best, FERC may use the proposed rule as a jumping-off point
for redesigning markets in a way that truly helps RTOs better accommo-
date state climate change policies. If this path is taken, then state and
regional policies will cause less friction for markets going forward—ren-
dering robust state decarbonization policies less problematic. At worst,
certain RTOs might use the proposed rule as an invitation to create their
own subsidy schemes aimed at propping up aging coal and nuclear for
reasons unrelated to climate change aims—and in large part, in direct
contravention of them.337 If this path is pursued, then states will likely be
glad not to have even partially ceded the goal of decarbonization to these
markets, only to have them work to actively undermine it.
These concerns—that RTOs and their participating states might end
up with competing objectives—highlight another potential avenue of
reform. Twenty-odd years ago, FERC created RTOs as a grand experi-
ment in new ways to manage electricity.338 But we have moved beyond the
early, experimental stage of RTOs’ existence. If their initial governance
dive_static/paychek/Comments_of_BFFC_Docket_RM18-1_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/8B34-
GQV3].
336. Note that there is substantial disagreement as to whether renewables do in fact
destabilize the grid. Many believe that state-supported renewables might actually enhance
grid resiliency. See, e.g., Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New
Proceeding, and Establishing Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012, 2018 WL
345249, at *15 (Glick, Comm’r, concurring).
337. For example, in November 2017, the mid-Atlantic RTO, PJM, proposed a “price
reformation” program that would allow for “inflexible” (that is, slow-ramping) units to set
the market price so as to better reflect “the true incremental cost to serve load.” PJM,
Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation 1–2 (2017), http://www.pjm.com/-/
media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20171115-proposed-enhancements-to-energy-
price-formation.ashx [http://perma.cc/HQ9P-NPBA] (defining “inflexible units” as
“those with declining average costs that are unable to economically produce power within
a certain range or that require an economic minimum output”). This proposal is more
market oriented than the DOE-proposed rule, but it still differentiates resources based on
“inflexibility” in ways that do not appear fully justified. PJM’s own market monitor opposes
the proposal. See Catherine Tyler, Valuing Inflexibility Undermines Energy Price
Formation, Monitoring Analytics 7–8 (2017), http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/
Presentations/2017/IMM_PJM_Energy%20Policy_Roundtable_Valuing_Inflexibility_
Undermines_Energy_Price_Formation_20170927.pdf [http://perma.cc/YTN4-PHHX].
338. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 811 (Dec. 20, 1999)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (establishing RTOs).
2018] ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND DECARBONIZATION 1135
structures turn out not to serve states well, perhaps it is time to consider
not only tweaking market design to accommodate state policies but also
more dramatically reforming RTO governance itself. There is not
enough space in this section to consider the possibilities and
practicalities of pursuing these larger reforms, but hopefully the
concerns raised here will prompt further inquiries in this vein.
D. But What About the Laggards?
This Article focuses on a conundrum facing states that are leading
the way in addressing climate change, arguing that they should cling to
the right to shape their decarbonization trajectories. In articulating this
argument, this Article has attempted to sketch the ways in which decar-
bonization is a “social” project, requiring care in crafting its contours
rather than merely its end game.
But the primary problem confronting state climate change policy
today isn’t the underappreciated “social nature” of decarbonization. The
bigger problem is the fact that a good many citizens—and state govern-
ments—deny the existence of climate change and refuse to do much of
anything to promote decarbonization. Laggard states not only do little to
address climate change within their own boundaries but also actively
impede efforts at federal climate change policies.339
For those who care about action on climate change, then, this
Article’s argument that we should leave states to shape their own policies
might seem to create a critical downside: Leaving the aims of energy pol-
icy to state legislators and regulators means accepting whatever ends they
democratically determine, be they climate change goals or coal mine job
preservation goals. Such risks are not hypothetical: Ohio has already pur-
sued efforts to provide supplementary ratepayer funds to several coal
plants at risk of retirement,340 and there is considerable interest under
the present Administration in protecting “baseload power” from renewa-
ble energy.341 This interest may prompt more states to enact policies that
seek to support not particular clean-energy sources but particular dirty-
energy sources.342
339. See, e.g., Samantha Page, 26 Attorneys General Are Suing the EPA. The Public Only
Agrees with Them in 3 States, ThinkProgress (Nov. 3, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/
26-attorneys-general-are-suing-the-epa-the-public-only-agrees-with-them-in-3-states-e935d36e42ba
[http://perma.cc/M9F6-U7D9] (providing a map of the twenty-six states suing the
Environmental Protection Agency to halt implementation of the Obama Administration’s
“Clean Power Plan” to address greenhouse gas emissions).
340. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. AEP Generation Res., Inc., 155 FERC ¶ 61,102
(Apr. 27, 2016), 2016 WL 1717028, at *11–12 (rejecting an attempt by Ohio generators to
pass through the costs of supporting certain in-state coal generation to captive ratepayers).
341. See Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940, 46,941–45 (Oct. 10, 2017)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
342. See Kavulla, supra note 56 (observing that such state laws “are proliferating, and
they are not limited to renewables but whatever a legislature might prefer”).
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Such is these states’ right in a federalist system with no overarching
federal climate policy.343 This state schism on climate change thus creates
a powerful argument in favor of federal action, which could bind all
states to achieving progress on decarbonization.344 But these arguments
are orthogonal to this Article’s inquiry, which is of a narrower scope:
Given the fact that no federal climate policy is likely to be forthcoming
soon, should states seeking to decarbonize work together through their
regional electricity markets to do so?
Using RTOs to address decarbonization simply does not have the
same power to pull along laggard states. Because of RTOs’ voluntary
membership and stakeholder-governance processes, laggard states would
be perfectly capable of blocking any RTO decarbonization proposals that
required them to go above and beyond on climate.345 And even if a
region were to figure out a way to allow certain of its members to pursue
decarbonization goals absent full regional participation,346 such cooperative
action would not stop other states in the region from pursuing policies
aimed at propping up carbon-intensive resources.347 Accordingly, although
state polarization argues for federal action, it does not lend force to pro-
posals to regionalize decarbonization policy through electricity markets.348
343. Of course, should the Clean Power Plan—the Obama-era regulation that sets
greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets for each state—ultimately persist, it will act as
a “floor” below which no state can go in terms of climate change policy. See Carbon
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). The
D.C. Circuit is currently entertaining a challenge to the regulations, which President
Trump has announced his ambition to withdraw. See Order at 2, West Virginia v. EPA, No.
15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2017) (granting a sixty-day stay of litigation); Exec. Order No.
13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,094–96 (Mar. 31, 2017) (mandating the suspension, revi-
sion, or rescission of numerous federal climate change reform plans).
344. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local
Climate Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1962 (2007) (“[S]ubnational state-level action is
not the best way to combat global climate change. This is true even assuming that fore-
stalling global climate change is of utmost importance, and even where the state-level poli-
cies are individually well designed.”).
345. See supra sections III.B–.C.
346. Cf. PJM, Advancing Zero Emissions Objectives, supra note 190, at 2 (proposing
that a subregion of states within PJM could pursue carbon pricing, although these might
have to be contiguous states).
347. There might be a legal differentiation, however, between state policies aimed at
decarbonizing and state policies aimed specifically at keeping old plants from retiring
simply to preserve jobs and economic benefits to the state. The latter type of state policy
might be more vulnerable to a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge than state envi-
ronmental initiatives. Cf. Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos. 17-cv-01163 & 17-cv-01164,
2017 WL 3008289, at *16 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017) (accepting the environmental purpose of
Illinois’s ZEC program but hinting that a program aimed exclusively at in-state economic
benefits would be vulnerable on these grounds).
348. Unless, of course, a laggard state is willing to up its ambition as a condition of
other states proceeding through the market construct—a contingency accounted for in my
three variables. See supra section IV.A.
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CONCLUSION
Scholars, regulators, and market participants all recognize that elec-
tricity markets, in their current form, do not incentivize the rapid decar-
bonization of the electricity sector necessary to respond to climate
change, thereby forcing states to act on their own. This realization has
provoked conversations at FERC, at RTOs, and among states as to
whether these markets should be redesigned to accomplish states’ cli-
mate change goals. This Article has questioned the use of redesigned
electricity markets as a driver of decarbonization in the United States. In
particular, this Article has pointed out the ways in which decarbonizing
electricity is a social project that should be managed by politically
accountable entities, working through public processes capable of chan-
neling and incorporating numerous goals related to decarbonization.
Those who are committed exclusively to the most rapid decarboniza-
tion possible are unlikely to be persuaded by this argument. It is true that
in the present political climate, using electricity markets to respond to
climate change would be an expedient and efficient pathway forward.
Nevertheless, this Article has highlighted the risks that attend expedi-
ency. If climate change policy is shunted into these markets rather than
left open for public debate, states will have lost a significant amount of
control over how decarbonization proceeds. Instead, these decisions will
be made in quasi-private governance institutions with complex voting
rules and opaque power structures, under murky jurisdictional bounda-
ries that may make it hard for states to assert concordant control.
The technical intricacies inherent in discussions over integrating cli-
mate policies and regional electricity markets often drive participants to
put aside larger questions regarding the animating forces of climate pol-
icy—at great peril. Debates over using electricity markets to accomplish
decarbonization should in fact highlight the question of why climate
change is a problem in the first place. After all, civilizations have crumbled
and species have gone extinct due to climatic changes.349 For many, the
answer to this question is that the continued peaceful existence of
humans on Earth—and the minimization of their suffering—is a worthy
aim.350 If the project of decarbonization is in service of the continued
349. See Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed 77–308
(2005) (documenting and theorizing the collapse of many past societies); Elizabeth Kolbert,
The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History 101–04 (2014).
350. See Dale Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle Against Climate
Change Failed—And What It Means for Our Future 164–67, 179 (2014) (exploring this
rationale for climate action and the challenges it presents for “commonsense” morality
and concluding that the task at hand is “to live in productive relationship with the
dynamic systems that govern a changing planet”); see also Steven C. Sherwood & Matthew
Huber, An Adaptability Limit to Climate Change Due to Heat Stress, 107 Proc. Nat’l Acad.
Sci. U.S. 9552, 9552 (2010) (explaining why an uninhabitable planet is a distinct pos-
sibility, since a temperature increase of around 7°C would “call[] the habitability of some
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wellbeing of humanity—and, potentially, species beyond humans351—it
must be part of a larger social conversation about how we want to live in
communities in the future. These conversations are worth preserving for
the public forum, in which debate, dissent, experimentation, and long-
term social visions can continue to develop within and alongside
decarbonization policies in the coming decades.
regions into question” for humans, and that “[w]ith 11–12°C warming,” most of “human
population as currently distributed” would reside in uninhabitable regions).
351. See Kolbert, supra note 349, at 268 (arguing that humans are not “what’s most
worth attending to”); Jedediah Purdy, After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene 249,
272 (2015) (arguing that understanding our present world as one where there is no
“nature” apart may open space for reimagining a “post-humanism” that gives all forms of
life equal value).
